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The area of study (Totororo) is situated on the margins of Empress Mine Township. 
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ABSTRACT 
The conjunctural dynamics of the Zimbabwe crisis after 2000 have produced a distinctive 
pattern of accumulation. Four features are noticeable in this pattern - firstly; disorder 
and/or violence has become common, both as a general feature and driver of wealth 
accumulation and the political project accompanying it. Secondly; the State has 
increasingly become more central and pervasive in driving accumulation and in the 
distribution of both economic and political goods. Thirdly, the crisis has awakened, 
reinforced and reshaped a distinctive acquisitive culture peculiar to the period in 
question, albeit resonating with the historical formation of Zimbabwe's ruling elite. 
Lastly, the current crisis has modified and reinforced a culture of 'strategic 
contradictions' within ZANU-PF. This dissertation is an analysis of Zimbabwe's 
'political economy of crisis' in the post 2000 period. It examines how the Zimbabwean 
ruling elite and those connected to the state have benefited from the unregulated forms of 
accumulation attending the Zimbabwean crisis. A broad combination of a contextual 
analysis of the crisis and its beneficiaries and a close case-study analysis of an 'informal' 
(illegal) gold-mining site in Totororo, rural Kwekwe's 'Empress' area in Central 
Zimbabwe are employed to try to distil accumulation patterns that have resulted from the 
present economic and political crisis. 
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Introduction 
Zimbabwe is in a serious political-economic crisis. The ripple effects of the militant 
chaotic land reform exercise code named 'fast track' makes 2000 a benchmark year. The 
chaotic, that is lawless, disorderly, 'free for all' and often violent manner in which land 
reclamations unfolded set in motion an unregulated form of wealth accumulation that has 
spread itself beyond the agrarian sector to other aspects of the economy. What occurs in 
present day Zimbabwe is a highly informalised and pervasive system of production that 
expresses itself in different forms from illegal gold mining to illegal trade in foreign 
currency. This informalised production and continuing crisis combine with the nature of 
Zimbabwe State to create a 'party state' that extends, recreates and reinforces itself by 
way of 'tapping into the chaos'. 
After giving a panoramic synopsis of Zimbabwe's mineral endowment1 the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) governor Gideon Gono in his April 2007 Monetary 
Statement interim review speech went notes that; 
With such richness, it is indeed unforgivable that as a country we should be having foreign 
exchange difficulties all because of bureaucracy. I am reminded of what His Excellency The 
President Cde R.G. Mugabe said on Sunday the 17th of March, 2002, during His inaugural speech, 
when He" said, "We can not afford the luxury of dilatoriness and bureaucratic sloth and 
indecisiveness." ...The continued unstructured turn of events in the diamond industry was fast 
becoming an embarrassment to the country, given the clear need for foreign currency to meet the 
wide-ranging national requirements for funding. It is for this reason that when the Central Bank 
makes clarion calls for order to be established in the diamonds industry as a matter of urgency, we 
do so with a deep desire not for the mere sake of wanting to be involved, but a genuine concern 
that our national heritage is being plundered whilst as a country we watch and most probably are 
not benefiting from such uncouth acts (Gono, 2007, 46) 
The 'clarion call' is in fact a muted attack on those in government engaging in illicit 
expropriation of diamonds. The governor, ostensibly in agreement with his superior, 
1 See annexure 1 
2 Note that 'he' with a capital letter (H) is commonly used for a deity like the monotheistic God. It is 
interesting that Gono uses the same to refer to Mugabe. Typically several of Mugabe's ministers have 
called him god or son of god at various times. 
blames bureaucracy for retarding 'progress' while simultaneously reproaching the 
'unstructured turn of events', and 'calls for order to be established' thus regulating and 
arresting 'uncouth acts'. 
Gono who seems to be saying that the rough and unregulated form of 
accumulation (or looting) should stop knows he can not do much to stop these activities. 
Gono's speech, as do finance minister Mumbengegwi's fiscal pronouncements,3 speaks 
of the inherent contradictions within the state and the internal rivalries for accumulation 
within the ruling elite. Equally, Mugabe's disgust with 'bureaucracy and dilatoriness' 
recasts the historically born contradictions endemic within Zimbabwe's ruling elite, 
which give direction to an emergent form of accumulation that has characterised the post-
2000 crisis . It is within this context that this study interprets the dynamics of 
accumulation in the post-2000 crisis moment, in so far as they are presided over and 
modeled by the Zimbabwe state. 
This essay examines how the Zimbabwean ruling elite and those connected to the 
state have benefited from the unregulated forms of accumulation attending the 
Zimbabwean crisis. In Raftopoulos and Phimister's (2004) phraseology, this is an 
analysis of 'the political economy of crisis' emerging in post-2000 Zimbabwe. A broad 
combination of a contextual analysis of the crisis and its beneficiaries complimented by a 
close case-study of an 'informal' (illegal) gold-mining site in Totororo, rural Kwekwe's 
3 For example both the 2007 monetary and fiscal policies by Gono and Mumbengegwi respectively are 
characterised by a strong commitment to respect property rights but the fact that the leases given to 'new' 
farmers are not efficiently regulated, even though they are said to be for 99 years, and that Large Scale 
Commercial farms are still taken even whilst promises are made to attract white farmers back, does not 
bode well for property rights. This commitment is rhetorical and indicative of contradictions within the 
Zimbabwe state. These also manifest themselves through policy discord between Mugabe and some 
members of his cabinet at various times such as former finance minister Simba Makoni and Gideon Gono 
on devaluation of Zimbabwe dollar and price controls inter alia (Zimonline, April 27 2007). 
4 It is important here to note that this form of accumulation as shall be explained later in the thesis was 
emerging well before 2000 but has been catalyzed by the crisis. 
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'Empress' area in Central Zimbabwe (see map) is employed to distill accumulation 
patterns that have been induced by the present economic and political crisis. 
The conjunctural dynamics of (re)distribution, ownership and accumulation 
attending the crisis are dissected. Four features of the crisis are noticeable - firstly; 
disorder and/or violence has become common, both as a general feature and driver of 
wealth accumulation and the political project accompanying it. Secondly; the State has 
increasingly become more central in driving accumulation and distribution of both 
economic and political goods though not in a progressive or developmental sense. 
Thirdly, the crisis has awakened a distinctive acquisitive culture5 peculiar to the period in 
question, albeit resonating with the historical formation of Zimbabwe's ruling petty 
bourgeoisie. Lastly, the current crisis has modified and reinforced a culture of 
'contradictions' within ZANU-PF; in actual fact a deliberate though seemingly 
irreconcilable duality of policy and modus operandi which ZANU-PF has used to its 
advantage. ZANU-PF has since 2000 walked conspicuously with two sets of policy in its 
pocket. This duality in the present can be distilled as a "technocratic realism quasi pro-
market approach" versus "authoritarian (strategic) populism". ZANU-PF has strategically 
vacillated between these two extremes (rather contradictions) successfully, to placate 
both internal and external support6. While the crisis is clear for everyone to see now it is 
necessary to go a bit further and trace it in time. 
5 This acquisitive culture refers to having a tendency to accumulate and engage in profit driven commercial 
activity, though quite often profits are not necessarily reinvested. 
6 It is observed that this argument is in a way a comment on Sam Moyo and Yeros' notion that despite the 
'revolutionary situation' of the late 1990s what has emerged in Zimbabwe is a radicalized state. They note 
what they observe to be a shift from the left towards right as signified by 'policy of normalization with 
capital' since 2003 epitomized by Operation Restore Order (demolition of informal strictures) in June 2005 
as marking an 'interrupted revolution' (Moyo and Yeros, 2007). It is argued that rather than these shifts 
pointing to an 'interrupted revolution' they actually betray post-2000 ZANU-PF as moving with two sets of 
dialectical policies inter changing them whenever it is profitable to do so. These contradictions have and 
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The crisis dates back to the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) 
introduced by the Zimbabwe government at the instigation of IMF and World Bank in 
1990. Far from its intended outcome the program impacted negatively on the economy. 
Poverty levels increased from 52, 8% to 75, 6% of the population between 1990 and 
1995, (Moore, J., 2003, 6). Moreover the costly 1997 DRC military intervention (Nest, 
2001) and the unbudgeted financial gratuities to liberation war veterans had a cataclysmic 
impact on the economy, eventuating a currency crash on 14 November 1997 otherwise 
referred to as the infamous 'black Friday' (Moore J., 2003, 6). The chaotic land invasions 
that started in 2000, disputed successive elections and resultant political unrest, 
international isolation and investor flight further added momentum to the crisis impetus. 
This set in motion a spiral of decline from which Zimbabwe is yet to recover. By 
February 2008 inflation was torpedoing 66 212,3%, from a late 2007 figure of 26 470,8% 
(CSO, February 2008 Statistics), the highest in the world. International Monetary Fund 
(February 2008) estimates are twice as high - 150 000% for January 2008 and 85 000% 
by December 2007. Unemployment hovers between 80-90%, the estimated percentage of 
people living in poverty is plus or minus 70% (Human Development Report 2007, 
Human Development Indicators, Country Fact Sheet), the annual decline in economic 
output has been about 7% since 2001, the foreign debt as of December 2006 was more 
than $5, 2 billion, and Zimbabweans had an average life expectancy of 36 years (the 
lowest in the world) (The Africa Report Quarterly. No. 5. Jan 2007, 147). As of May 
will probably always be there but at different moments ZANU-PF has learnt the art of when to let one 
dominate the other depending on expediency. No wonder despite the 2003 plus 'policy of normalization 
with capital' the land invasions have started again and in September 2007 an indigenization bill to reduced 
foreign stake in the mining industry. 
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2007 the government had lost 15 000 employees over the past 12 months, translating to 
about 40 per day {Financial Gazette 16 May 2007). 
Special attention in this essay will be given to members of the ruling elite, 
consisting of state functionaries such as the police, state secret security agents, Chiefs and 
Headmen - those connected to the ruling party. The study examines how these interact 
with non-state actors and ordinary people more specifically in illegal gold mining at a site 
near Totororo Secondary School in rural Kwekwe7. The controversies and dynamics 
surrounding the appropriation of land in and around Chegutu area (100km south west of 
Zimbabwe's capital city Harare) are referred from time to time in order to shed more light 
on the thesis, especially in the fourth chapter. The study points to policy contradictions in 
the Zimbabwe state; the role of violence, disorder, and warlord style politics; a new class 
of accumulators emerging with the increased centrality/instrumentalisation of the state for 
accumulation; and what Bayart (1999) might call 'criminalization of the state'8 in the 
post-2000 forms of accumulation. The field study was complemented by a desk study of 
RBZ monetary statements, government pronouncements and publications that have 
included parliamentary debates, Central Statistics Office (CSO), presidential speeches, 
both provincial and national newspaper reports and as much complementary literature. 
Prior to the crisis, Totororo was largely dominated by rural subsistence farming 
activities. In the 1990s small scale miners emerged under the Zimbabwean government's 
7 Kwekwe is found in the Midlands Province of Zimbabwe and as a metropole for the surrounding rural 
areas provides vital trade networks for the illegally extracted gold and other commodities. Some have even 
suggested that Kwekwe's economy now rests largely on illegal/informal gold trade {Midlands Observer, 
June, 2005, 3). 
8 Although the notion of 'criminalisation' derives from Bayart the usage in this thesis goes beyond Bayart's 
tendency towards cultural/political analysis. It is invoked from the standpoint of accumulation. 
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indigenization program after the demise of Falcon Gold's Empress Mine9. The small 
scale miners had networked peacefully with individual 'illegal miners' (largely from the 
surrounding rural subsistence farming community) who sold gold to them in order to 
benefit from gold processing mills. The increased economic difficulties and the high 
levels of unemployment have however seen more and more people from urban areas 
becoming involved. An accidental discovery of a 'pebble' of gold in 2005 in a field not 
far from Totororo resulted in an unprecedented gold rush. The field was dug up and 
century old abandoned gold mining shafts within its vicinities were reopened. This 
heightened the already contested and unregulated process of accumulation involving 
those within and connected to the state, and those without. At the extreme this has 
degenerated into a form of warlordism as rival players, especially those connected to the 
state, clash in order to gain exclusive access to the site.10 
That smuggling occurs at a large level is indicated by the fact that at the national 
level minerals smuggling is said to be prejudicing the economy in terms of US$400 
million annually (Gono, 2007). In 2005 gold deliveries to Fidelity printers fell by 37% to 
13 000 kgs, compared to 21 300 in 2004, largely due to smuggling (Banks and Banking 
Survey, 2006, B6). The government's statements and actions against these activities have 
been contradictory and largely rhetorical. This reiterates the point that the state has been 
criminalized, and has been instrumental in this new accumulation drive. Those connected 
to the state have benefited the most from this apparent chaos. 
9 Falcon Gold Zimbabwe is a Canadian company operating a number of mines in Zimbabwe. A number of 
its mines closed due to problems of viability largely due to fuel and electricity shortages. Empress mines 
closed in 1989 purportedly because ore was said to be exhausted (Zimbabwe Standard, 2005 (no date) 
accessed online on 12 September 2007). 
10 The warlord features in post-2000 accumulation trends in Zimbabwe go beyond contestations for mining 
sites. Warlord styles of accumulation have been common in the amassing of land by Zimbabwe's ruling 
elite. In 2006 for example, two ministers in the Zimbabwe government clashed over a farm in Chegutu. 
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The author spent one month doing participatory observation with the people 
involved in illegal gold mining. There are a number of sites close to the study area where 
similarly contested accumulation processes are taking place but because these places 
were nearly inaccessible due to the prevalent fuel shortages and scarcity of public 
transport these could not be visited. Moreover some of the sites were reported to be so 
characterised by violence that it was too risky to go there. For that reason one had to rely 
on accounts from those who had been to these places. An attempt to follow and analyse 
the product (or commodity) chains (Gereffi, Humphrey, Kaplinsky and Sturgeon, 2001) 
and trade networks was made but this met strong limitations. From the outset, given the 
sensitivity of the subject the researcher had to rely on personal connections presently and 
previously involved. This is not a subject one can easily discuss freely to a stranger. At 
one point there was fear and anxiety in the community as to the researcher's identity. 
Some feared the researcher to be a CIO (Central Intelligence Organization) (Zimbabwe's 
national intelligence) operative11 whereas some speculated connection with the pricing 
commission12 among other things. 
It was difficult to trace the trade networks at higher levels from the point gold 
leaves the hands of a local buyer because the trade is so secretive - so secretive that at 
times a local buyer does not know who he/she sells to. Again, to get information about 
this aspect reliance had to be placed on insiders of the networks who have been or are still 
involved. This was backed by media reports. With regards to the police, interest was on 
11 It is now common in Zimbabwe to have members of CIO planted almost everywhere to root out 
dissenting voices. For that reason most people have become skeptical of strangers fearing the victimization 
which has characterised ZANU-PF's campaign of intimidation. As well, verbal accounts of people 
suspected to be opposition members being beaten up are common. In Chegutu, one man was said to have 
been beaten for complaining that things were expensive in a local shops. Some of the people who beat up 
people, claiming to be CIO agents, might be merely overzealous ZANU-PF party members. 
12 This was at a time when Mugabe had announced price slashes and price monitoring teams were moving 
about with police forcing retailers to heed Mugabe's decree. 
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how these law enforcers have attempted to arrest these activities and the outcomes 
thereof. 
In order to theorize this activity, this study has relied on literature on the post 
colonial state in general for broad conceptual aspects (Saul, 1979, Leys, 1976, Moore, 
2006, Chabal and Daloz, 1999) and the Zimbabwean state in particular (Mandaza, 1986, 
Moore, 2004, Kriger, 2006). Additionally, this study tests theories about the post colonial 
state and primitive accumulation in accounting for accumulation forms attending the 
crisis in Zimbabwe. It brings to the fore the salient role of the state in the transformation 
of social relations of production in this unregulated form of accumulation. The 
investigation and analysis of outcomes is done on three levels: first, within the local 
community in which this accumulation is taking place; second, between the 
community/non-state actors and the state; and last, among state actors or members of the 
ruling elite who have been involved. The thesis notes that what is happening in 
Zimbabwe manifests certain aspects pointing to a new form of accumulation on one hand, 
while on the other showing some features of the orthodox theoretical patterns of 
accumulation. Semblances of the typical post colonial state patronage system and 
tendencies towards state collapse and its attendant features of warlordism are also 
noticeable (Reno, 1998, Maclean, 2002). 
The first chapter outlines the broad conceptual framework for the study. It 
elaborates and accounts for the theoretical foundations of the study. This overlaps to a 
review of relevant literature - for example on the nature of the post-colonial state - and 
its historical lineages. The chapter also traces the evolution of ZANU-PF's 
contradictions. It explains why this study is an attempt to make a contribution to the 
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contemporary questions of primitive accumulation. Light is cast as to what extent can the 
Zimbabwe crisis be said to be springing from what Moore (2004, 87) regards as primitive 
accumulation's unfinished task. 
Chapter two presents the historical context. This short and very broad chapter 
traces the processes of accumulation in the pre-colonial state through to the first two 
decades of the post-colonial state. Chapter 3 gives a panoramic outline of the 
accumulation trends that have characterised the post-2000 Zimbabwe crisis, its violent 
turns, and disorders, lack of regulation and involvement of the ruling elite. Having started 
with a broader outlook this chapter narrows down to the case study in order to locate it 
within the broader context. Chapter 4 is a follow up to the chapter 3 and is meant to give 
a micro and incisive view of the vicious processes of accumulation taking place in 
mineral exploitation by zeroing in more on the Totororo case. It looks at the role of state 
and non state actors, contradictions in state policy and practices, networks involved, 
conflicts, processes and outcomes. Together with chapter 3 this forms the main emphasis 
of the thesis. Chapter 5 concludes the study by interpolating and interposing 
accumulation trends and networks discussed in chapter 4 with national trends, providing a 
clearer outline and analysis of how the local processes are interacting with the national 
ones. Besides being a summary and interpretation of findings, the thesis makes 
conclusions with regards to the class and accumulation outcomes of the Zimbabwe crisis. 




Conceptualizing the Crisis 
Introduction 
This thesis locates itself within; firstly the neo-Gramscian theories of the post-colonial 
state for the broader questions of the study and secondly primitive accumulation for both 
its broad and narrow aspects. Grappling with the nature of the post-colonial state in 
Africa enables us to locate the state's functions in the process of accumulation and to 
make sense of the political economy. This means, then, establishing the relationship 
between the classes that are trying to accumulate - or becoming bourgeois - in Africa and 
their relationship with the state. In this instance, coming to grips with the nature of the 
state aids in unpacking the state's behavior with regards to accumulation. It betters our 
understanding of why the Zimbabwe state (more particularly, those who act within the 
structures of the state) behaves the way it does with regards to the main pattern of 
accumulation emerging from Zimbabwe's contemporary crisis and its concomitant 
13aspects. 
In this analysis the state is viewed as class biased or class subservient. This 
conceptualization differs from the Weberian 'iron caged bureaucracy', 'ideal state type' 
(Lefort, 1986, 97) that suggests an officially functional (corporate) state and separable 
from the private. In Zimbabwe, like most parts of Africa the possibility of a well 
functioning state is receding. To insist on the 'ideal type' would lead us to talk of a 
In a review of this work before final submission Moore (2008) pointed out that given the fact that the 
African ruling class is just emerging, slowly and fitfully, to say this is not to say enough. The state, too, is 
not a fully developed entity. This is consistent with the following arguments. 
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country without a state . Of course some extreme views have alluded to such a 
possibility. To be sure, the crisis has, besides exhuming the hitherto somewhat buried 
historically embedded questions of 'state formation' (Moore D, 2006), threatened the 
very existence of the Zimbabwean state qua state. Given the limitations of the present 
discussion I will not delve more into this. Needless to say, and without falling into 
journalistic sensationalism, Reynold's assertion (2007, 4) that "the myth of Zimbabwe as 
a national entity ended in 2004 ..." may not be too far from the truth15. 
It is argued here that the nature of the post colonial state accounts for the 
unmitigated control of the state apparatus by those managing it. For this very reason, one 
would argue that in Zimbabwe, the idea of state and the state complex in itself is in crisis. 
Furthermore, and in the Zimbabwean context, the historically evolved 'contradictions' 
within the ruling elite add a unique twist to the nature of the post-colonial Zimbabwe 
state and its role in the accumulation process. This reality is integrated into this thesis to 
further unpack and give reason to the state's inconsistencies and contradictions in 
In light of this formulation it is persuasive to suggest that in most African states 'the state has 
disappeared' if ever it has been there. This formulation might be likened to Mamdani's (1996) idea of 
undifferentiated state or Chabal and Dalozi's (1999) non-emancipated state yet these still entertain the idea 
of state. The geo-polities that we call states today are nothing, but big organizations of accumulation, either 
at local or global level. States are becoming less and less embodiments of contradiction, i.e different classes 
competing for control which rationalizes bureaucracy. This trend is noticeable not only in Africa but big 
countries like US where big corperates seem to have taken over, suggesting Robinson's 'transnational state' 
(Robinson, 2005). 
15 Reynolds' somewhat radical view on Zimbabwe as having ceased to exist as a national entity centres on 
his observation that with several million Zimbabweans in SA, Zimbabwe is now virtually a province of 
S.A., that the Zimbabwe dollar is no longer a working currency and that internally people are relying on the 
rand. This is not the view of this author though. Rather the view in the context of the discussion is that 
issues of land, legitimacy, sovereignty, human rights, call to revisit and redress the 1980s massacres in 
Southern Zimbabwe and parts of Midlands by the Mugabe regime, patrimony, bureaucracy and 
constitutionalism aroused by the crisis are what bring into question the matter of statehood and state 
formation. These aspects of the crisis, in a way point to an unfinished business of state formation. The crisis 
has further impacted on this process. It might be too much for this work to assess whether the impact has 
been progressive or regressive. 
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economic policies and the lack of decisiveness in dealing with unregulated/illegal forms 
of accumulation such as gold mining and smuggling. 
The second theoretical premise is primitive accumulation. As noted above, this 
notion is used to try to understand both the broad and narrower concerns of this study. 
Though others (Davies, 2004) may argue otherwise, the crisis can be seen in the context 
of primitive accumulation. This accords us explanation for the emerging accumulating 
class 'in a mirror dimly' during this age of 'crisis', its violent currencies, and the 'warlord 
politics' characterizing post-2000 accumulation in Zimbabwe. 
The 'political economy of conflict' (Reno, 1998) theory also adds light to 
understanding these 'crisis patterns of accumulation'. It is alluded to in the course of this 
thesis from time to time for its analogical value to the Zimbabwean situation. However in 
its stead, the inference, 'political economy of crisis' a variant but equivalent is used. This 
is more appropriate since Zimbabwe is not in a state of civil war yet and may never be 
despite strong suggestions by some analysts to the contrary (Bevan and Pienaar, 2007). 
Moreover, Zimbabwe does not qualify as a weak or failed state, which a strict application 
of the political economy of conflict theory would entail. Instead we have an official state 
that has been turned into a vehicle for private accumulation, behaving like Reno's 
'shadow state' in a way1 , enforcing and refraining from enforcing legal provisions to 
regulate accumulation for the benefit of members of the ruling elite, or their connections. 
Traces of Anderson's 'absolutist state' that emerged during Western Europe's long 
periods of primitive accumulation (1974, also Mamdani, 1996, 11-12) are noticeable, yet 
unlike in Western Europe the Zimbabwean process has not always encouraged more 
productivity. 
16 In Zimbabwe a 'Party State' might be the equivalent of Reno's 'shadow state' for now. 
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Rethinking the Post Colonial State 
"...the problem of the nature of the state created after independence is perhaps the secret 
of the failure of African independence" (Cabral, quoted in Saul, 1979, 4). 
The present scenario in Zimbabwe represents an extreme case of "the state being used as 
an instrument of accumulation and violence wielded by a dominant social class" (Chabal 
and Daloz, 1999, 5). Moreover this class may be actually on its way to becoming 
dominant. Manifestly, to understand the state's nature in contemporary Africa is to 
engage oneself with the dynamics of the dominant state class not only within national 
localities but the overall global complex of hegemonic production relations and forces 
(Cox, 1987). The state thus becomes a geo-specific location of production/power 
relations. This makes it possible to talk of an internationalized state versus a localized 
state; the former is however beyond our present scope. 
The colonial heritage has produced a state that is 'non-emancipated' and 
undifferentiated from the ruling petty-bourgeoisie class (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, 4-16) 
thus susceptible to instrumentalisation for accumulation purposes, mostly for narrow, 
personal, group or class interests. Such accumulation often takes local/state capital 
(which may be constituted by the ruling elite itself) versus colonially inherited local white 
capital and international capital lines. Yet in the Zimbabwe case, colonial and post-
colonial, as shall be observed later, these fault lines have not been so sequential and easy 
to trace. 
Alavi (1972) and Saul (1979, 179) have postulated that the problem of the 
post colonial state rests in its inheritance of an overdeveloped 'super structure'; making it 
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"over-developed in relation to the 'structure' in the (ex-) colony", as its base lay in the 
metropole rather than the periphery. It is not suggested here that the state's base still 
derives from the metropole. In fact unlike in most parts of colonial Africa as shall be seen 
in chapter two, in colonial Zimbabwe if anything the state's roots have always been in the 
periphery, largely in the local rural white bourgeoisie, settler capitalists and miners. By 
and large, this status quo persisted up to late 1990s, eventually shifting in the 2000 
aftermath to rest more within the party elites through its ability to appropriate surplus. 
Because the state directly appropriates economic surplus through a 'bureaucracy' it not 
only becomes central to accumulation but peculiarly so17 wherein vests the paternalistic 
propensities of the state. "The post colonial society inherits that over-developed apparatus 
of state and its institutionalized practices through which the operations of indigenous 
social classes are regulated and controlled", (Saul, 1979, 169). According to this 
theorization the state forms the central part in the production process. This centrality is 
further consolidated by either the absence of an indigenous economically dominant class 
(Saul, 1979, 5) or the successful subjugation of potentially rival classes. Further, it has 
been common for the African ruling elite to align with international production forces. 
Often in such cases this bureaucracy becomes very strong relative to other local social 
forces. 
The 'peculiarity', lies in the fact that whereas in contemporary Western Europe the relation between the 
state and capital is one where capital uses the state whether directly or indirectly but without necessarily 
occupying political office, the African case makes it unclear whether it is the state that uses the capital or it 
is capital that uses the state, as normally the same individuals double as state bureaucrats, politicians and 
capitalists. This is further complicated by the uninstitutionalised nature of the state structure and as a result 
these three roles end up functionally intermingling. This however is not historically peculiar as present 
accumulation trends and state centrality in appropriation of surplus in Africa seem to mirror the processes 
of primitive accumulation and its complexities of absolutism, patronage and overlap of state and 
bourgeoisie functions in 15,h - 18th century Western Europe, (Anderson, 1974). 
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In the first decade of post-colonial Zimbabwe the ruling elites engaged in a 
macroeconomic policy compromise that sought to balance distributive welfarism on one 
hand versus protection of capital interests on whose material base they relied on the other 
(J. Moore, 2003, 108) in what Yash Tandon (cited in Mandaza, 1986, 14) would 
characterize as a 'schizophrenic state'. According to Saul state bureaucracy in post 
colonial states should be understood alternatively as either "a class in the making or a 
class of a new type" (Saul, 1979, 5). In our present discussion this bureaucracy is defined 
broadly to include all state and ruling party functionaries from civil servants to party and 
government officials. This intersects with Miliband's 'power elite' though the latter is 
broad, overlapping with the ruling elite to encompass leaders of industry, commerce, 
public and private sectors (1987, 325-246). Despite Saul's initial, but partial, faith in the 
bona fide nature of this bureaucracy, in Tanzania to be more specific,18 what this theory 
implies is that the ruling class, through a colonially bequeathed politico-economic 
structure, is enabled to manipulate its position in the distribution of political and 
economic surplus towards its ends, often along lines of patronage. The overdeveloped 
nature of the state accounts for the elite's monopoly over state resources, distribution and 
how identity aspects of that distribution such as tribe, party affiliation among others get 
along. 
On his part Colin Leys prefers to call the independent African state 
underdeveloped rather than overdeveloped (1976, 43). This is probably due to the fact 
that Saul and Alavi seem to premise their analysis more on the coercive aspects while 
Leys notes the weak administrative capacity. With respect to the overdeveloped state 
notion's assumption of a colonially inherited 'larger than' bureaucracy Leys opines that 
18 It is important to acknowledge that Saul's recent works have shown a departure from this faith. 
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the implausibility of the notion derives from the fact that the colonial state actually 
disposed of some of its military force and ceased to rely on the metropole once it had 
overcome initial resistance. The tendency to expand the civil service and armed forces 
has been more common in the post colonial state than its predecessor (1976, 41-2). In 
Tanzania for instance the state's "middle and upper rungs" expanded "from 4,452 posts at 
the end of 1961 to 12,000 in 1971 to 16,183 at the end of 1974 and well over 20,000 in 
1980" (Freund quoted in Moore, 2006, 12). Nevertheless, the divergence between Saul et. 
al. and Leys seems to revolve around the origin of the 'overdeveloped state' rather than 
the idea itself. To be sure, there is need to rethink Saul's postulation on the colonial 
traceability of overdeveloped state complex. But that is as far as we can go. To say 
bureaucracy becomes more expansive and ramified in the post colonial era than the 
colonial, is to in fact suggest an even more overdeveloped post colonial state. Moreover, 
it is a fact that civil society has been weak in the African states, allowing for an 
unchallenged state. To this extent one is persuaded to stick to the overdeveloped state 
concept. 
On a different premise, Chabal et al (1999, 9) suggests that, "the state (could be) 
strong and powerless, overdeveloped in size and underdeveloped in functional terms". 
The latter might apply to cases where the bureaucracy lacks capacity to perform some of 
its functions. For instance in South Africa, some government departments are under 
spending because they lack the human skills to implement envisaged programs. However 
the post-2000 Zimbabwean case posits a state that is overdeveloped both in size and 
function. To be sure, prior to the 2000 fallout with white landed capital and its eventual 
elimination one could say that the post colonial state was not so overdeveloped vis a vis 
- 1 6 -
white capital, as this class managed to have the state protect its interests. This takes into 
account Leys' contention that in order to understand the post colonial state class struggle 
we need to start our analysis at the level of class rather than the state. He argues that by 
looking at the state as a point of departure, "the idea of an 'overdeveloped state' is an 
apparent reversal of the proper order of procedure" (Leys, 1976, 43). However, it seems 
by attempting to understand the state we are engaging ourselves in an analysis of class 
struggles. In the Zimbabwean case it appears more fruitful to look at the state, where the 
emergent ruling elite/accumulating class distinction is becoming so blurred that it can 
hardly be understood in reverse i.e. by starting from the concept of class. 
Interestingly, Leys asserts that the centrality of the state is no more important 
in post colonial Africa than it is in the west. This is important in testing the 
overdeveloped state's claim of exclusivity to post colonial states. He argues that the state 
is central in all class societies (1976, 43), save that; 
It may be more 'embracing' (i.e. may own more reproductive forces or intervene more 
directly in various areas of social life) in some societies than others but in this respect it is 
typically less 'central' (extensive would be a better word here) in most post-colonial societies 
than in most advanced capitalist societies" 
In Zimbabwe in particular, the shortages punctuating its crisis demonstrate the centrality 
of the state, as if to verify the 'ovedeveloped' thesis. The state's centrality in managing 
accumulation has been further entrenched. For instance, the National Oil Company of 
Zimbabwe (NOCZIM), the regulator and/or sole procurer of fuel has become more 
strategic than before, thus an arena for fierce rivalry between members of the ruling elite, 
most doubling as business moguls19. Ministries of energy and transport have become 
19 Government policy has been characterised by sporadic shifts. This has been so especially more recently 
as the shortage that has forced the government to liberalize fuel procurement. As is the case with the Grain 
Marketing Board, fuel sales from NOCZIM have been very cheap, often those well connected buy fuel 
from NOCZIM and resell it at inflated prices on the illegal - but actually encouraged - parallel market. 
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more contested in light of the politics of strategic positioning. Procurement of combine 
harvesters by the Ministry of Agriculture with assistance from the Reserve Bank also saw 
members of the ruling elite jostling to get them - using their positions within the state to 
further and secure their business interests (The Standard 9 May 2007). 
The shortage of foreign currency has also seen the elevation of the role and power 
of the reserve bank governor as he literally 'dishes out' foreign currency to 'strategic 
sectors and businesses', most of which are linked to members of the ruling elite. Not 
surprisingly, veiled pleas for discipline directed at the members of ruling elite have 
become common in Gono's monetary statements; 
In order to instill discipline and sanity to prevail in the oil industry, as Monetary Authorities, we 
recommend that punitive measures, including possible suspension, be taken on those oil importers 
who have been found to have abused the Government's concessional fuel facility. Specifically, 
those who accessed foreign exchange at official bank rates and went on to charge parallel market 
related prices must be brought to book (Gono, 2007). 
Similar sentiments have also been echoed in finance minister Samuel Mumbengegwi's 
fiscal policy pronouncements; one asserting, for example, that "a small proportion of the 
population is now accumulating wealth overnight, in part benefiting from the price 
distortions arising from some of the policies and facilities meant to protect the very poor" 
(2007 Budget presentation). These calls have largely gone unheeded or are at best used to 
settle political scores, most of which originate in rivalries over accumulation20. 
Clearly the state, directly or through contacts with state managers, has 
become integral for those who are intent on accumulating wealth. Even those individuals 
Examples of this include the arrest of Chiyanga (Mugabe's nephew and former MP) after accusations of 
spying for South Africa, Kuruneri (former MP) for externalizing foreign currency, Charles Nherera (Vice-
Chancellor of Chinhoyi University and Former Zimbabwe United Passenger Company ZUPCO board) for 
corruption at ZUPCO. This also implicated Vice President Joyce Mujuru, Local Government Minister 
Ignatius Chombo and Deputy Information Minister Bright Matonga who were never arrested (Financial 
Gazette online edition 13-01-20005, 29-04-2004, 22-09-2005) and even Gideon Gono, 
(NewZimbabwe.com, 18-02-2008). Former liberation war commander Mujuru's recent house arrest, though 
linked to ZANU-PF succession politics has also been accompanied with threats of fraud charges against his 
vast business empire (The Zimbabwean 13-02-2008 accessed at www.thezimbabwean.co.uk). 
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or power elites who appear to be 'outside' the state, can not survive or prosper without 
manipulating state's relationship with these unregulated accumulation forms. The state is 
salient in these 'rags to riches' cases. For instance, in the bread and fuel shortages some 
individuals, though not directly linked to the state, rely on bribing the police to either 
access or sell these products at inflated prices, thus making supernormal profits. Some 
have 'taken off through this to operate viable and relatively capitalized medium scale 
businesses. 
Of significance in all these conceptualizations and critical in this study is the 
role of 'governing intellectuals', to be conceived of in the Gramscian mode (Simon, 
1982). The thesis asks whether this group in charge of the state can be called a class and 
to what extent can its actions be construed as confined to class interest. It is these 
intellectuals who control the ex-colonial state machinery because of their centrality 
during the struggles against colonial rule. As alluded supra and of material consequence 
to the nature of the post colonial state is the impact of hegemonic global forces. The 
behaviors of Zimbabwe's ruling elite are in a significant way a product of their 
interaction with these forces. 
Contradictions within Zimbabwe's ruling elite 
To understand the post colonial state is to understand those who are in charge of it. As 
mentioned above, the state is not class neutral but a mere modality of class domination. 
This "forces one to see the state as a contradictory site of both accumulation (not 
necessarily productive) and hegemonic construction" (Moore, 2004, 407). The 
intellectuals assume a very important and central position especially in the context of the 
- 1 9 -
overdeveloped nature of the African state. The evolution of this class, also referred to as 
the petty bourgeoisie or 'intellectual elite engaged in trade' (Fanon quoted in Saul, 1979, 
353), maybe more appropriately a 'power elite' (Miliband, 1987) owes its position in the 
state to modern learning, concerns and associated skills (Shils, 1971, 251) rendering it a 
custodian of political consciousness and central in political transformation. In the 
contemporary Zimbabwean ruling elite the political discourse of the 'liberation war 
credentials' criterion is used to lay claim on resources and power (Kriger, 2006). As Shils 
notes, "for the intellectuals to inherit their true estate, they must live in a political society 
(1971, 276)". This estate overlaps political office, to include the material appendages that 
come with it. This explains the tendency by some "intellectuals who have reaped the 
fruits of the struggle" to become dissociated from active politics in pursuit of business 
(emphasis added) (Shils, 1971, 272). 
In the case of these fruits diminishing21 the politically inactive intellectuals, 
some who were concentrating on business may re-enter active politics. Raftopoulos and 
Phimister indeed note a trend towards the late 1990s of increased intertwining of the 
ruling party and indigenization pressure groups. 'Membership of (these) organizations 
became an important launching pad for aspiring ruling party politicians', (2004, 361), (in 
actual fact aspiring towards bourgeois status). This thesis observes this as pursuing 
economics by political means. It is evident in this study that the 'constricting cake of the 
liberation struggle' (or threat to it) has resurrected political interest within the formerly 
politically 'resigned' elites. It may be that the agitation of former combatants in the late-
1990s and the clamour for land reform and economic inclusion found impetus in the 
economic decline and scarcity associated with the period. Consequently, as elsewhere in 
21 The fruits may diminish or simply be threatened in crisis moments. 
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post-colonial Africa, joining or alignment with incumbent ZANU-PF has become a pre-
requisite for those seeking to lay/reassert claim on the 'benefits of the struggle'. The 
strategy has been to use, "struggle credentials to legitimate themselves and de-legitimate 
others in competition for power and resources" (Kriger, 2006, 1151). Politics of 
recognition thus occupy the core of accumulation and (re)distribution modalities in the 
post colonial state. 
Despite the pervasiveness of these features in many post colonial states, the 
variations need to be accounted for. While the general theory of state and intellectual 
hegemony is useful in understanding the managerial class in the post colonial state, there 
are many peculiar cases that cannot be adequately explained by theoretical 
generalisations. The conjunctural aspects and dynamics of state's role in primitive 
accumulation within the context of Zimbabwe's economic and political crisis render 
credence to this view. It is at this juncture that Moore's conceptualization of the 
contradictions now inherently cogged within Zimbabwe's managerial class becomes 
useful. He argues that an understanding of the contradictions that characterize the 
ideological evolvement of ZANU's ruling consciousness provides for the ironies and 
ambivalence that characterize ZANU-PF's ideological/policy expression. Two phases are 
notable with regards to this evolvement, namely the "populist versus elitist" tone during 
1950 and 60s and the "Marxist versus Capitalist" of the 1970s (1989, 482 & 483). The 
ZANU in the 1960s is characterised by Arrighi as a "faction of educated, middle class, 
rather elitist elements" (Ranger, 1980, 72). Prior to independence, "In exile, the parties 
came to manifest many of the negative features characteristic of petty-bourgeoisie politics 
in independent, neo-colonial Africa ..." (73). 
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The 1976 crisis within the liberation movement and the subsequent quashing 
and purging of the young and radical Marxist ZIPA (Zimbabwe People's Army) cadres 
who were seen by the 'old guard' to have attempted a 'coup' gestated Marxist vs. 
Capitalism contradictions which seem now to have taken an anti-imperialist/pan-
Africanist/redistribution populism vs. neo-liberal/technocrat/realists turn in the post-2000 
ZANU-PF policies22. The outcome of the 1976 crisis was a victory for the bourgeois, (in 
actual fact an 'authoritarian populist') faction within ZANU-PF, a victory from which, in 
John Saul's terms, ZANU-PF has never recovered (2007, 2). The irony emerging out of 
this historical moment is that the triumphant 'old guard' besides its naturally acquisitive 
inclinations went on to take a visibly socialist path (Moore, 1989). This probably 
reinforced the "vicious circle created by the petty bourgeoisie pattern in Zimbabwe's 
liberation camp", (Saul, 1979, 121) even prior to 1976. It is this 'old guard' consisting of 
Mugabe and his associates (Ranger, 1980, 72) which emerged dominant in the new ex-
colonial government. As Mandaza observes, "It is the petty bourgeoisie which is the 
inheritor of state power ... thus the internal contradictions break out again', (1986, 1). 
The 1976 triumph of the 'old guard' was an ideological coup whose ghost rose to haunt 
Zimbabwe, particularly at the post-2000 crisis conjuncture and 
foreground(s) the use of a political language in a pattern of appropriation and re-appropriation by 
those within the ruling party who seek to legitimate their quest for power and resources. Arguably 
this political language characterises a strand in the politics of African nationalism in Zimbabwe 
since the 1960s (Kriger, 2006, 1151). 
It is noted here that though most former ZIPA leaders have formed the Zimbabwe Liberators Platform 
(ZLP), an oppositional body to the state aligned veterans organisation, the Zimbabwe National War 
Veterans Association (ZNWVA) and are effectively out of ZANU-PF this sort of binary has persisted. In 
this thesis this binary has taken the form of 'strategic' vacillations by the state to balance the often 
contradictory interests of Capital on one hand, labour and redistributionist groups on the other. It shows the 
rhetoric that is characteristic of Zimbabwe's ruling party. This is further explained below. 
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It is then no wonder the contradictions within Zimbabwe's ruling elite have 
baffled analysts of all ideological hues. The emergence and bolstering of a broad and 
strong opposition movement in the aftermath of 2000 has spurred the resurgence of what 
is otherwise 'vulgar nationalism' in the name of redistributionism. This has been by and 
large populist, unsustainable and inconsistently pursued and often interjected by 
'technocratic realism' characterised by an appreciation of more orthodox economics. Not 
least in this dilemma has been the left with regards to analyses and solidarities; 
While the politics of land redistribution has been characterised by some as a key marker of anti-
imperialist and anti-neoliberal politics, others have been equally concerned about the authoritarian 
politics that has been the modality for the land interventions of the Mugabe regime (Raftopoulos, 
2006, 201). 
The analytical dilemma stems not only from redistribution/anti-neoliberal versus 
authoritarian politics dichotomies but more so the nascent 'socialist'/populist rhetoric and 
ideological ambiguities within the policy frame which seems to reinforce "a breakdown 
of the norms of liberal governance through the machinations of an authoritarian political 
figure" (201) as a cause of the crisis. The fiscal and monetary policies have often 
colluded with the popular acclamations of allegiance to the 'social agenda'. These 
policies' clearly declared intention (though with varying tones) since 1980 has been and 
still is the protection of capitalist interests. The policies of the first decade, for instance, 
though far from being an outright capitalist endeavor were not socialist either. ZANU-PF 
seems to always talk left and walk right. More often than not, at the level of fiscal and 
monetary policy ZANU-PF is 'very right' but in certain forums sounds very left23. To be 
sure, ZANU-PF has shifted positions depending on the audience rather than the 'blue 
prints'. This has been useful in camouflaging looting. The rhetoric of sovereignty, 
23 To see this one needs to compare RBZ policy and financial statements on one hand and ministers and 
presidential speeches on the other - see for example 27 2007 April Monetary Policy Interim Review, 
Financial Statement and Mugabe's 2007 birthday speech. 
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redistribution and welfarism has been used as a political driver to galvanize the masses to 
support and entrench a private hegemonic agenda, as well as to woo public hysteria 
against perceived enemies ostensibly working in the interests of global hegemonic forces. 
This masks narrowly focused party/individual driven processes of accumulation. 
Bond and Manyama have summed up these contradictions. 
We have heard left rhetoric from Mugabe most vociferously when forceful popular challenges 
arise: the early 1960s resurgence of anti-colonial protest, the mid/late-1970s Left turn within the 
ranks of exiles and during the brief ZIPA experiment, the 1980 upsurge of worker confidence in 
the wake of liberation, the mid 1980s dissidents from Matebeleland, the late 1980s student 
demonstrations against incipient neoliberalism, the 1996-1997 rural and war vet rebellions and the 
resurgence of protests by workers and genuine democrats since then. Acting right has been 
observed while Mugabe was in league with motley white tycoons (Rowland, Oppenheimer, 
O'Reilly, Cluff, Bredenkamp, during the 1980s-1990s), white United States (US) government 
military advisors (early 1990s), and white economists from the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund (beginning in 1981 but especially from 1990, until the falling out in 1998) ... 
(2002, xiii). 
A Crisis of Primitive Accumulation? 
That Zimbabwe is in a serious economic and political crisis has become a cliche. As 
noted in the introduction, the incremental negative effects of the failed Bretton woods 
economic reforms (ESAP), the financially burdensome Congo military involvement, the 
financial gratuities given to the country's liberation ex-combatants and the subsequent 
November 1997 currency crash form the main sign posts in the build up to the post-2000 
political and economic crisis. The state's reactionary authoritarian populist policies 
marked by the encouragement of land invasions from 2000 to the current forced price 
cuts (from July 2007) and successive disputed elections have exacerbated the crisis. Since 
then the economy has been constricting continually. Corruption soars amidst a thriving 
illegal market that sees almost everything from fuel to cell phone airtime voucher cards 
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being sold at inflated black market prices . At the level of economic policy the 
government seems clogged, literally hopping from one policy to another in as many years 
after 1997. On the political front there has been increased political unrest against an ever 
diminishing democratic space, and the country is facing international isolation. 
This thesis focuses on the increase in extra-legal informal economic activities, 
ranging from the informal currency trade, the selling of scarce commodities like fuel at 
black market, the smuggling of minerals, to the manipulation of state resource 
distribution and the salient role of the state in managing these activities, to the resultant 
use of disorder and coercion. The state's dealing with illegal gold trade, as with farm 
invasions, has abetted rather than arrested this phenomenon. This work will not detain 
itself with an exhaustive study to establish the causes of the present crisis. There is a 
wealth of literature on that (Gibbon, 1995; Kanyenze, 2004; Moore J, 2003; Bond and 
Manyama, 2002; Moore D, 2007; Carmody, 1998). To be sure, however, some of its 
origins can be explained and accounted for by analyzing the role of the state in the 
dynamics and the emergent forms of primitive accumulation attending the Zimbabwean 
crisis. This forms part of this thesis's tasks. The imperative of discerning the emergence 
of the crisis in the first place is inescapable. However, as of 2007 the crisis has become 
circular and self reinforcing. 
At a superficial level, as well as from that of the Washington Consensus and many 
in the journalistic profession, the Zimbabwe crisis is a product of bad economic and 
political governance (Moore J, 2003, 1-2) period! Such a claim finds impression in the 
24 When I went to Zimbabwe in March 2007 Telecel (Zimbabwe's third cell phone operator after Econet 
and NetOne) cell phone recharge cards were in short supply and were being sold in the streets at inflated 
prices. A voucher worth ZW$3000 worth of airtime was being sold at between $4000 and $5000, $1500 for 
$3000. 
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visible lack of democracy, rampant corruption and blatant disregard of rule of law that 
characterize Mugabe's rule. The crisis has in this way been attributed to Mugabe's 'big 
brother gone bovine mentality'. The problem with this view is that it reduces the 
Zimbabwe crisis, its concomitant violent currents, and ZANU-PF's 'mafiaism' to some 
irrational, uncivilized and barbaric behaviors. It is tantamount to perpetuating the neo-
liberal dogma that posits all conflicts located in the 'fringes' of global capital as primitive 
(in a very negative sense) and based on "essentialist ideas of ethnicity, tribalism, identity, 
and primordial animosity", (Cramer, 2006, 7) "internal, illegitimate, identity based" 
selfishly destructive, regressive and characterised by abuse of civilians (Duffield, 
2002,1052). Descriptively, this may be true - but analytically speaking, this cannot be a 
very fruitful approach. 
Instead, the crisis and use of violence can be adequately understood from the 
vantage point of primitive accumulation and its historical context - not only of capitalist 
development but of contradictions within the ruling elite traceable to the liberation 
movement's formative period, the challenges and the nature of the post colonial state and 
those running it. This work thus posits the crisis as a condensation point and a moment of 
truth. To borrow Cramer's exhortation, "civil war is not a stupid thing". One can not just 
kill or hate without a reason (2006, 283, 286); the violence that forms the core of ZANU-
PF strategy must likewise not be viewed as a stupid thing25. To try and understand it 
otherwise would be to mystify and miss the point. Without of course falling into Chabal 
Whereas the Zimbabwe situation may not be regarded as a war case in the magnitude of recent crises in 
Angola which Cramer discusses more or in DRC and Sierra Leone among others, Cramer does not restrict 
his analysis exclusively to such highly armed conflicts but uses this in reference to general conflicts 
associated with primitive accumulation as transformative conflict. 
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and Daloz's 'Africans are naturally inclined to be Neo-Patrimonial' stereotyping trap , 
we should speak of the "exploitation of disorder" or a "disorder ... which is in fact a 
different 'order', the outcome of different rationalities and causalities" (1999,155). 
Violence and disorder has not only been a vehicle for the reproduction of 
hegemony/domination but more importantly a tool for a particular form of accumulation. 
The other view - John Moore (2003), Kanyenze (2004), Carmody (1998) for 
example - locates the current crisis in the failed economic structural adjustment program. 
This view carries weight for two reasons. Firstly, there is a clear link between the failure 
of ESAP and civil unrest. This economic discord led to calls for civil liberties on one 
hand and on the other gave birth to both a political and a socio-economic rights discourse, 
as well as a series of articulations based on indigenous rights for an emerging bourgeoisie 
and issues around the land redistribution/restitution impasse. The former couplet was 
championed largely by the constitutional change movement in the form of National 
Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZTCU) 
while the latter was articulated through indigenization pressure groups such as the 
Indigenous Business Development Centre (IBDC) and Affirmative Action Group (AAG) 
(Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004, 360) and Zimbabwe National War Veterans 
Association (ZNWVA). Secondly, the worsening disrespect for human rights and rule of 
law can be seen as Mugabe's response to civil unrest and threat to his rule. This explains 
not only the unrest and economic decline but also the repressive political responses. 
26 While reference is made to Chabal and Daloz this is not without reservations, for they seem to suggest 
that Africans have different 'rationalities'. This feeds in too easily into a 'Africans have a different 
mentality than "Europeans" or "Europeans" are "Weberian", Africans are "neo-patrimonial"'. Duffield 
regards this as the 'them' versus 'us' dichotomies, 'their wars ... are internal, illegitimate, identity based' 
selfishly destructive, regressive and characterised by abuse of civilians, thus implicitly comparing to 'our 
wars', are between states, 'legitimate' 'show restraint' and civilized frame (2002, 1052). Preference as 
manifest in this thesis' line of argument is to look at it from a common rationality of accumulation - in 
different historical contexts. 
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Moreover it can be argued with ease that Mugabe's rule in post colonial Zimbabwe was 
never tolerant of dissent (despite the silence of the west then) as testified by the 1980s 
Matebeleland massacres27 and the violence that has characterised all national elections 
since 1980 among other things (Kriger, 2005). The rise of the strong MDC opposition in 
1999 simply served to expose ZANU-PF's intolerance and predatory instincts, adding to 
the political dimension of the crisis. It provoked the rise of reactionary authoritarian 
populism in ZANU-PF. 
The post-2000 Zimbabwe crisis case scenario bears many semblances to a war 
economy; an unregulated or at best slackly governed process of accumulation by the elite 
and its cronies. This slack regulation can be attributed to the informalisation of 
production accompanying the Economic Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) and its 
aftermath (Mawowa, 2006, 2)28. The violent nature that accompanied land reclamations, 
further extending to (though barely mentioned) militant interventions in manufacturing 
Military clashes between two former liberation movements in Zimbabwe ZANU-PF and PF ZAPU that 
saw Mugabe's Fifth Brigade killing up to an estimated 20 000 mainly civilians in a bid to thwart opposition 
in Middle and Southern parts of Zimbabwe, (Zimonline 16 May 2007) or CCJP Report (1999) - Breaking 
the Silence. 
28 In this honours thesis the author observed that the ESAP policy of liberalization and the attendant 
retrenchments led to unprecedented rates of unemployment, and had a direct bearing on the emergence of a 
wide thriving informal sector as most redundant formally employed people found solace in informal 
activities. Liberalisation also provided for the inclusion of new players into the informal economic 
activities i.e. women. Whilst informal economy suggests 'deregulation', deregulation in the strict sense 
could be misleading. It has been common in most developing countries for governments to try and monitor 
it in a way or deliberately spear head it to broaden the accumulation base. This inevitably entails a level of 
regulation, though minimal. For instance legislation that deals with informal sector, municipal by-laws inter 
alia and legal restrictions on currency trade and other national laws have to be abided with. In Zimbabwe 
despite having a government ministry concerned with it, the informal sector has not been, at least 
minimally, regulated thus has virtually formed a parallel economy. Attempts at enforcing regulatory laws, 
(which are sometimes conflicting) have been half hazard and inconsistent (Mawowa, 2006, 41-42), an 
example being the Operation Restore Order (demolition of houses and informal structures in June 2005). Its 
unregulated nature has seen it being susceptible to extra-legal practices. Government official have also been 
implicated in most of these activities which range from gold trade, forex deal, fuel sales, trade in scarce 
commodities among others. 
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industries and other businesses , added impetus to a violent form of accumulation that 
has at it worst seen gangsterish clashes between top members of the ruling party as they 
vie for mineral and land resources. This is not uncommon even hitherto, so much that it 
would not be far fetched for one to try and locate the current succession debate within the 
ruling party along the fault-lines of resource aggrandizement and accumulation rivalry. 
What one sees in ZANU-PF as political camps could be no more than economic 
rivalry camps. It is in this light that Sandra Maclean (2002) has situated her analysis of 
the Zimbabwe crisis within Reno's political economy of conflict model (Reno, 1998). 
Reno invokes the notion of 'Shadow State' consisting of internal and external networks in 
and around the state bureaucracy. The shadow state thrives in a weak state which allows 
for a patronage system centered on the ruler's control of resources. In such state 
liberalisation often provides new entrepreneurial opportunities to individual elites and 
strongmen whose interests are to counter the ruler thus giving rise to warlord politics. 
Consequently the survival of the warlords revolves around continued control of resources 
resulting in fierce contest for strategic resource. In Zimbabwe the obtaining unregulated 
nature of accumulation accompanied by violence, has seen members of the ruling elite 
using 'war lord style' coercion to acquire agriculture land, access, acquire and safeguard 
illegal mining sites and indeed businesses, not only against large-scale commercial 
farmers, but often in competition with one another. 
The Zimbabwe crisis can thus be broadly summed up as conditioned by and 
epitomizing the challenges associated with "primitive accumulation, nation state 
formation and democratization in the contemporary age of neo-liberal globalization in 
29 For example in the post-2000 period it was not uncommon for ruling party MPs, who were also business 
moguls, especially Philip Chiyangwa and Saviour Kasukuwere, to storm manufacturers and force them to 
reduce prices, or threaten to buy them into personal businesses (The Herald, 3 June, 2001). 
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developing societies" (Moore, 2007). The Zimbabwean case exhibits some features of the 
16th and 17th century European 'Absolutist State' (Anderson, 1974), which came as a 
result of the demise of feudalism and lay the stage for the processes of primitive 
accumulation. Historically 
...the methods of primitive accumulation are anything but idyllic, (as) ... fearful and painfull 
expropriation of the mass of the people forms the prelude to ... capitalism. ... great masses of men 
are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled as free and 'unattached' 
proletariats on the labour market" (Marx, 1972, 432, 437, 433, also see Perelman, 2000, 29-32). 
It is this mass that finds itself alienated from the land that provides wage labour for the 
emerging capitalist class. 
By its very nature "state force and non market modalities" are characteristic of 
primitive accumulation though specific situational variations give variations to the "twists 
in its [primitive accumulation] tail" (Moore, 2007). In certain instances especially in the 
weak third world, disorder or a form of it augments or alternates with violence as an 
instrument for primitive accumulation and is necessary to secure and reproduce a form of 
political domination that best suits it. In these countries, without external injection of 
capital which may expedite it, the process has tended to take its normally slow pace30, 
even becoming stalemated. In a worse scenario the process can turn to be one of 
'permanent primitive accumulation'. Violence can become a permanent feature, bound to 
worsen, more so in the absence of strong democratic institutions31 that may have 
The accumulation process takes a protracted route, slow and often riddled with contradictions and 
counter currencies which might amount to a reversal of the process. In Europe the development of 
capitalism took centuries, (Anderson, 1974, Perelman, 2000). For Marx too, primitive accumulation was by 
no means an immediate transformation but should be understood in relation to long histories of feudalism 
and slavery (Max, 1972, 431-438). This explains why I have decided to position this analysis in the context 
of primitive accumulation despite some developments within the current crisis which may suggest reversal 
or stagnancy of the process. 
31 This is not to presuppose that erection of democratic institution will inevitably lead to a regulated and 
ordered process of accumulation. Indeed as IMF and World Economic Structural Adjustment policies' 
insistence on widening of democratic spaces have shown, democratic institutionalization has increased the 
chances of unrest and led to a worse scenario of accumulation (Bienefeld, 1995). It is however important to 
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otherwise served to mitigate it. In the Zimbabwean case the unique contradictions within 
the ruling elite juxtaposed to the current crisis further add more 'twists' to the 'tail' of 
primitive accumulation. Not least has been the transformation of property rights that has 
(at least hitherto) defied the teleological trajectory of capital accumulation (De Soto, 
2000). 
Further to the peculiar twists to the crisis of primitive accumulation in Zimbabwe 
is what may be considered the 'disarticulated' nature of its emergent forms of 
accumulation. At the extreme, the post-2000 attempted 'economic transformation' can be 
seen as primitive accumulation in reverse; for primitive accumulation supposes the 
teething of capitalism. As Rob Davies remarks, "Rather than capital being accumulated, it 
has been destroyed", the economic costs have outweighed the gains (2004, 22). The 
outcome of Zimbabwe's land appropriation and its concomitant changes in social 
relations of production, prima facie that is, has been the replacement of or shift from 
capital accumulation toward more primitive modes of accrual. Most farms that were 
centers of commercial production have been reduced to fallow lands or areas of 
subsistence agriculture at best, (with agricultural equipment such as irrigation pipes, and 
water pumps being taken away and sold, livestock and crops plundered); making a clear 
case of 'primitive accumulation in reverse'. Tobacco production is said to have decreased 
by more than 80% of pre-2000 production, estimated maize yield for 2007 is 600 000 
tones, a far cry from the expected 1,8 million tones (Association of Zimbabwe 
Journalists, May 2007). 
have institutions that make it possible to discipline rent seeking behaviors by the state bureaucracy and 
curtail arbitrary distribution of national surplus. Absence of these has worsened the situation in Zimbabwe. 
There is need in this respect for a consideration of a philosophy of human rights that equally encompass 
economic rights of (re)distribution as well as civil liberties (Sen, 2004, 69-88). 
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Primitive accumulation however, should be understood as a long process and that 
while many may see the crisis as a setback or counter to the process of primitive 
accumulation it does not exclude the eventual development of the process. Moreover the 
period of study is too short to make such a conclusion. The teetering back and forth may 
be suggestive of the character of the process, the contradictions and struggles that typify 
it, more so in this case shaped by the nature of Zimbabwe state and its interaction with 
the transnational hegemonic forces. Whilst one may not exclude the possibility of a 
stagnated process, primitive accumulation is by no means linear, but constituted by 
transitional and transformational vicissitudes, continuities and reverses. 
By completely wiping away the then pre-existing white capitalist mode the state 
created a "terrible interregnum between the dying of the old and the birth of the new" (D. 
Moore, 1990, 41). Such an approach negates the historical tendency of primitive 
accumulation where nascent capitalism articulates (joining to; giving expression to; 
linkage to) (Foster-Carter, 1978, 54) to pre-existing modes of production. This 
'disarticulated' attempt at economic transformation created irreconcilable disharmony 
resulting in catastrophic economic ramifications. A dominant critique against the nature 
of land reform process reflects this, as one former Daily News32 staffer remarked (2005), 
"While land reform was necessary, Zimbabwe did not need to go hungry at the end of the 
day"33. Nascent modes of production cannot be erected mechanically, nor without leaning 
on and/or articulating with pre-existing modes. "Indeed, so far from banishing pre 
32 The Daily News was an independent newspaper in Zimbabwe highly critical of the government. It was 
banned in 2003. 
33 The remark was made by a former daily news editor in an interview with this author on behalf of Erin 
Maccandless in 2005. The name is withheld for the reason that doing so would probably require the 
interviewee's prior consent since the interview was conducted for Erin's research and not for this particular 
work. 
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capitalist forms, it (Capitalism) not only coexists with them but buttresses them, and even 
on occasions devilishly conjures them up ex nihilo" (Foster-Carter, 1978, 51). Though 
banishing a capitalist form dominated by a white minority (and not pre-capitalist forms in 
this context) the disastrous outcome of 'localization of production' in Zimbabwe can be 
attributed to this 'disarticulated' attempt to remodel production relations. This cracked 
the economy as it robbed the transformation process of the structural and infrastructural 
foundation on which to stand on. Moreover the new form of accumulation has tended to 
be consumerist which scarcely leads to industrialization. In quite many instances this has 
been unlike Marx's, 'Accumulate! Accumulate!' instead, it has been 'accumulate and 
squander and accumulate and squander and ' without any reproduction of surplus. 
Having established our conceptual premise, it is necessary, before entangling the 
nascent forms of accumulation, the crisis and its beneficiaries, to map out the historical 
trajectory of Zimbabwe's political economy. The following chapter will trace the 
processes of accumulation (both formal and informal) in the period of the colonial state 
through to the first two decades of independence. 
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Chapter 2: 
State and Accumulation in Zimbabwe - A historical overview 
Introduction 
Zimbabwe's economic development up to the present crisis points to unresolved 
questions of primitive accumulation. Modern day capitalist development and 
accumulation began at the close of the 19th century, as the Pioneer Column landed into 
the area covering modern day Zimbabwe.34 More than a hundred years on, as in most 
parts of Africa, the path to a fully fledged and self sustaining market remains elusive. 
This is because since its inception, capitalist development has been riddled with 
contradictions, regressive turns and has at least up to now, not banished pre-capitalist 
modes to the extent that the process has in the developed north35. The failure of primitive 
accumulation to deliver on its 'historical tasks' and conceive an unambiguous 'market 
civilization' (term used by Moore, 2007, 199) in the 'global margins' (developing world) 
has protracted the vagaries associated with the process. 'Blood continues to drip from its 
pores' to this very day. 
This chapter provides a synoptic overview of the etiology of Zimbabwe's present 
crisis and thus outlines the broad context for the study. It is argued here that Zimbabwe's 
capitalist development has been regularly interrupted by moments of political-economic 
Prior contacts with external capitalist system (Portuguese merchant capitalist for instance) had of course 
existed through trade with pre-colonial societies and states such as Great Zimbabwe, Torwa and Mutapa 
State. Nevertheless the advent of European settlers forms a landmark juncture in Zimbabwe's history of 
capitalist development. It ushered in a largely state driven process of capital accumulation marked by a 
process of dispossession and land alienation to produce labour surplus on one hand and facilitate the 
growth of a white settler accumulating class on the other. 
35 For instance traditional ownership forms and power structures have continued to exist parallel to the 
capitalist modes, in both the pre-colonial and post colonial state. Not only do they exist parallel to the 
Capitalist Mode of Production but also are linked to it, with the provision of cheap labour (by for instance 
allowing subsistence to subsidize wages), a space for the reproduction of labour power, among other things. 
See Foster-Carter (1974) on 'articulation of modes of production' 
crisis. Notwithstanding drought years, five such crises where political economic 
contradictions became insurmountable are referred to in this chapter namely: 
• the crisis of the 1890s and early 1900s triggered by the speculative bubble; 
• the slump in the late 1920s/ early 1930s connected to the world's great 
depression; 
• the political/economic dynamics of the 1950s and early 1960s that resulted in the 
1965 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) and the subsequent sanctions 
• the problems of slow growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Bond and 
Manyama, 2002, 1) culminating in the Economic Structural Adjustment Program 
(ESAP) and; the present crisis stretching from the mid 1990s. 
It is important to point out that - and significantly so - for this study and unlike the 
previous moments, the present crisis has been markedly sustained and has produced 
different accumulation types/trends. A consideration of these historical moments provides 
for a comparison of the political, social and economic outcomes of these epochs with the 
present. 
The State and Capital Accumulation in the Colonial State 
Ironically and as if to foreshadow Zimbabwe's history of successive capitalist crises the 
first footing of capitalist development started by way of a crisis. Having missed out on 
the scramble ensuing from the 1896 discovery of the main reef of Gold on the 
Witwatersrand, Rhodes' company moved north of the Limpopo River in search of a 
'second rand'. This was largely based on extravagant speculative claims, resembling the 
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myths and legendary 'Rumours of Ophir', said to lie between Limpopo and Zambezi . 
Having duped Lobengula (King of the Ndebele State which was located in the southern 
part of Zimbabwe), Rhodes claimed to have been granted 'all metals and minerals 
situated and contained in my [Lobengula's] Kingdom together with full power to do all 
things that they may deem necessary to win and procure the same'37 (Phimister, 1988, 5). 
However the amount of gold deposits found proved too small for serious profit 
generating mining, resulting in serious losses on the part of the BSAC. Besides this 
disappointment the company had to contend with resistance by local people to land 
alienation, further compounding the losses. After defeating the Ndebele and Shona 
people the colony experienced a momentary speculation driven boom in investments and 
commerce flourished. 
In order to recapitalize the company which was responsible for administering 
(governing) the colony had to go on a propaganda overdrive to woo investments and 
attract more white settlers. For example the company's 1895 report claimed Rhodesia had 
'hundreds of miles of mineralized veins' (Phimister, 1988, 11). This resulted in a 
speculation triggered crisis that was to affect the settler colony's development from the 
late 1890s to early 1930s. A boost in the white settler population however followed. 'By 
August 1894, Bulawayo ... already boosted over 100 general stores, 3 banks, 12 hotels, 3 
newspapers, 26 share brokers and 9 solicitors' (Phimister, 1988,10). A solid foundation 
for the emergence of a strong white indigenous accumulating class, a feature uncommon 
6 The area covering modern day Zimbabwe has been a subject of a number of legendary claims of gold 
treasures, some of them hidden more than a century prior to colonization. Such exaggerations likely came 
from pre-colonial Portuguese traders who had traded with successive Shona dynasties of the old Mutapa 
state and modern day Zimbabwe (Ellert, 1993). Also see Paul Freeman's novel, Romours of Ophir (1998). 
This, as it later turned out, was a facade. Lobengula later denied to have agreed to these terms and even 
made an effort to raise the issue with the Queen of England. His protests never succeeded. See Phimister 
(1988,6). 
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in most colonial Africa, had thus been set. It was this class that would dominate the 
colony's political-economy until its demise in 1980 (Arrighi, 1966, 36). In fact this class 
outlived the colony and only saw its demise in 2000. 
After the 1893 and 1896 wars of resistance, the company moved to end the 
speculative holding of land. Measures were put in place to discourage speculative holding 
of land thus compelling capitalist mining industry to begin. In September 1899 gold 
production increased from less than 7000 oz to 65 000 oz and to 200 000 in 1902 
(Phimister, 1988, 22). This initial growth in mining industry led to the development of 
peasant agriculture as the mines relied on these for farm produce. This trend continued up 
to the 1930s despite the Company's tax regime and other measures taken to force 
Africans to provide labour in the mines. Because this mining was marked by low 
profitability, worsened by a failure to attract cheap labour, a shift towards more 
permanent and inward-oriented agrarian and manufacturing-based forms of accumulation 
were adopted. This triggered massive land dispossessions. Meanwhile pressure on the 
company administration saw legislation being passed to try and promote small white 
miners, individual prospectors and to give more say on governance issues to settlers, 
away from the BSAC. 
Three significant outcomes can be distilled from the speculative crash of the 
1890s. First is the diversification of the Rhodesian economy from mining to include 
agriculture and manufacturing. The shift to agriculture set the stage for a more aggressive 
mode of land appropriation. By 1926 manufacturing contributed 13% of the colony's 
GDP. Second is the reliance on rigidly regulated state managed processes of capital 
accumulation through laws and physical coercion. Thirdly, and of more consequence, 
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was the emergence of and growing salience of a white rural bourgeoisie in the colony's 
political economy. It is thus not surprising that in 1923 the company administration was 
replaced by a government dominated by the white rural bourgeoisie. 
The rural bourgeoisie consisted of three accumulating fractions. Firstly there was 
a group of "owner-workers of small and medium-sized mines and farmers, secondly, 
international capital represented mainly by the BSAC which controlled the railway, most 
of the mines and also land for mainly large scale plantations. The craftsmen engaged in 
manufacturing formed the third" (Arrighi, 1966, 36-37). Prior to the Second World War, 
the non capitalist classes were clearly divided on racial lines. There was a class of white 
wage earners on one hand and the African peasantry which would invariably take the 
form of wage workers, middle class and an African bourgeoisie, on the other. 
The dominance of the white rural bourgeoisie is reflected in the state 
accumulation matrix that shaped the colonial state's economic policies and legislation. A 
series of legislation and policies were adopted to further this class's interests. This was 
meant to give an advantage to the indigenous white accumulating class over the emerging 
African bourgeoisie and to a limited extent, international capital. The 1930s for example 
saw the adoption of discriminatory laws such as the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 
(LAA), the Maize Control Act of 1931, the Cattle Levy Act of 1931, the Industrial 
Conciliations Act (1934) and its 1937 amendment, the Tobacco Marketing Act of 1936, 
the Native Registration Act of 1936 and the subsequent tightening of pass laws. These 
were intended to create an advantage for white capital, increase the white settlers' access 
to land, and ensure a reliable supply of cheap African labour for whites by dividing the 
economy along non-competing racial lines. Public works were carried out to provide 
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supportive infrastructure for white capitalist development. "This body of legislation and 
policies was well summed up in the prevailing ideology of the period: the doctrine of 
parallel development or of the two-pyramid policy according to which inter-racial 
competition ought to be prevented" (Arrighi, 1966, 43). The result was the reduction of 
African competitiveness on one hand and consolidation of a white accumulating class 
increasingly reliant on the state on the other. 
The aftermath of the Second World War witnessed a boost in the white 
manufacturing capitalist class in Southern Rhodesia. This rise was by no means linear but 
an alternation of depression and prosperity between 1950s to early 60s. It is within this 
period that we locate our second crisis moment. To start with, the disruption of industrial 
production elsewhere by the war increased demand for locally manufactured goods and 
farm produce. Challenges of the great depression had seen the white settlers shifting to a 
policy of what today might be termed 'deglobalisation' (Bond and Manyama, 2002, 4) to 
an explicitly inward-oriented development trajectory. The period also saw a dramatic 
increase in foreign investment, some of which was fleeing a threat of nationalization 
under the Nationalist Party government, which had come to power in the Union of South 
Africa. We see again political transformations happening within these capitalist crisis 
conjunctures. 
On the whole Godfrey Huggins' term as prime minister from 1933 to 195638 saw 
an even stronger shift to a managerially commandist 'State Capitalism'. This was marked 
by the introduction of formal racial legislation epitomized by the Land Husbandry Act 
(1955), increased state credits, subsidies and other forms of support to white farmers. 
38 Huggins was prime minister of Rhodesia from 1933 to 1953. The formation of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 saw him become its first Prime Minister up to 1956. 
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International capital's increased influence in the early 1960s saw attempts at legislative 
reform that would abolish the colour bar in employment and leading to the overthrow of 
the United Federal party by a coalition of the indigenous bourgeoisie and white workers 
who wanted to protect their interests. The emergent political formation led by Ian Smith 
(former Rhodesian Prime minister) worked to consolidate the white rural bourgeois' 
interests by maintaining the discriminatory legislation and unilaterally declaring 
independence from Britain in 1965. 
As with the previous periods this crisis period had its specific outcomes. Firstly 
and most clearly is the continued salience of the white rural bourgeois, whose dominance 
was also maintained by the support of a white middle class who saw more to gain in such 
an alliance since it felt threatened by the emerging black middle class. Secondly, the post 
world war industrialization and economic boom had seen the emergence of a proletariat 
and early traces of a black bourgeoisie. Thirdly, this period witnessed the birth of the 
black liberation movement, led by the emerging black middle class. This class developed 
political consciousness and started to demand inclusion in the colonial system of 
governance. This advocacy for inclusion soon turned into calling for an end to colonial 
rule. 
The overheating of the regional economy due to foreign loan repayments did not 
spare Rhodesia in the late 1970s (Bond and Manyama, 2002, 7). This, coupled with the 
international sanctions against the UDI and the intensification of the guerilla war, 
constitutes the ingredients of the third phase of Zimbabwe's capitalist development. In 
the wake of this crisis the state reacted with more rigorous central planning, strategic 
investment and intensified import substitution industrialization. With support from South 
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Africa and Portuguese-ruled Mozambique, Smith managed to dodge international 
sanctions and defaulted on foreign debt. "The result was one of the world's fastest growth 
rates - 9, 5% annually - 1966 to 1974" (Bond and Manyama, 2002, 7). However 
stagnation eventually set in. The overproduction of luxury goods for the limited 
consumption of whites and the limitations of a colonially designed accumulation process 
eventually resulted in stagnation from late 1970s. 
Before looking at the post colonial period, it is important to dissect the patterns of 
accumulation emerging from the colonial state. A command economy under a policy and 
legal framework meant to promote a narrow accumulating class whilst leaving the large 
part of the population excluded was common in successive colonial policies. The 
combination of class forces interplayed to produce the compromise 1979 Lancaster house 
constitution. This compromise left questions of redistribution unresolved. For instance, 
that one percent of the farmers (minority white) owned half of the agricultural land (also 
the most productive) compared to the 98% (blacks) that owned the other half 
(unproductive land) (Cliffe, 2000, 36) was unsustainable in the long run. 
The extremity of the unevenness was best painted by Alex Duval Smith in an 
article to The Independent (UK 9 May 2001) at the outset of the 2000 farm invasions: 
"Piers Nicolle has a wife and two sons and controls 54,000 acres of prime farmland. 
Shakespeare Tome has four wives, 28 children and five acres"39. That this imbalance was 
a product of a colonial state whose dominance was being vigorously contested meant 
such a configuration would always be contestable, awaiting an opportune moment for 
rupture. Additionally, traditional power and ownership structures in the communal areas 
39 Piers Nicolle is was a farmer in Banket Mashonaland West Province in the north eastern part of 
Zimbabwe. 
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disharmonious with primitive accumulation's historic 'mission' were maintained 
especially through the amalgamation of customary and state controlled property areas for 
natives (Rutherford, 2001, 3). 
The inherited political economic structure not only had a lot of unresolved 
questions of primitive accumulation but had within itself structural limitations that would 
inhibit the journey towards market civilization. It is this inheritance that forms "the 
weight of history" to use Freund (1999)'s phrase in examining the chances of 
democratization in post apartheid South Africa - the "dead hand of past generations" 
(Moore, 2006, 10) that was to haunt Zimbabwe. 
The post Colonial State and Accumulation up to 2000 
To understand how the post colonial state interacted with economic challenges over the 
period it is necessary to examine a few factors. The compromises of Lancaster House 
meant that maneuvers to redress matters of economic injustice, especially in the first 
decade could only go as far as they did not threaten the white rural bourgeoisie. Secondly 
and as noted in chapter one, to add to this, Mugabe's 'talk-Left act-Right' art born out of 
the liberation movement's successive ideological struggles added a twist to the 
'schizophrenic state'. In the absence of a strong civil society, the state could vacillate 
with ease between a policy of appeasement of the white bourgeois on one hand and 
socialist welfarism on the other. Moreover, Zimbabwe was seen by the west as some sort 
of bulwark against ANC-Communist influence: capital, both local and external was 
content in giving plenty of leeway and even buttressing the new regime. 
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In addition, the ruling petty bourgeois that inherited the state having what Freund 
calls 'private acquisitive instincts' (1981, 490) became umpires in the accumulation game 
in which they had vested interests. This petty bourgeois was also content to ride on the 
accumulation of the white bourgeoisie making it a sort of 'internal comprador' which in a 
way would mesh with Joe Slovo's idea of 'colonialism of a new type' (1990). For both its 
political and economic ends, it had to maintain the colonially bequeathed interventionist 
economic regime that largely favored local white and international capital. 
Simultaneously, the promissory nuances of liberation years meant that the state had to be 
seen to be moving towards a more socialist path. For its private acquisitive instincts the 
use of the state in a model of appropriation guided by patronage became the order of the 
day, setting the stage for the development of an accumulating class drawn mainly along 
patronage lines. 
The immediate aftermath of independence was characterised by 'a twin 
phenomenon' of redistributivist policies and mutual suspicion between government and 
capital (almost wholly white owned) (Gibbon, 1995, 7). Despite the constraints of the 
Lancaster house agreement, the first two years if independence saw the resettlement of 10 
000 households out of an initial target of 18 000, followed by 15 000 in 1982/83. Despite 
this early progress, the following years saw stubbornly retarded progress in resettlement. 
By 1990 48 000 households had been resettled - 40 000 had been resettled by 1985 and 
71 000 by 1997 (Cliffe, 2000, 38; Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004, 362). According to 
Mumbengegwi (cited in Cliffe, 39) the initial progress owes to the 'abandoned (as a 
result of liberation war) and underutilized land that was the prime target for acquisition', 
and once this was exhausted the 'willing buyer willing seller' did not bear much fruit. 
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Others have attributed the stalling of the program to drying of donor funds, especially the 
British (Cliffe, 39). 
There was also internal opposition to the program as championed by the local 
white farmers through organisations like the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) and the 
Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), parliament, and their influence on/in the 
ruling party. It is no wonder the Land Act of 1992 and the 14th Amendment to the 
Constitution met with little political backing (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004, 362). The 
state thus reflected the dynamics of international and local capitalism, as well as the 
emerging African bourgeois and petty bourgeois. In the absence of a long term vision on 
agriculture, a 'risk aversion strategy' 'careful not to upset colonial agriculture' in 
particular and the colonially inherited economic structure in general saw technocratic 
decisions dominating Zimbabwe's land policy prior to 2000 (Cliffe, 2000, 41). 
On the economic front, the first year of independence saw an economic boom 
although this was not sustained. The 4% average annual growth rate was higher than 
most African countries and 1% higher than population increase, but the remainder of the 
decade saw population increase eclipsing economic growth, low export growth, balance 
of payment (BOP) problems, shortage of foreign exchange and low investments 
(Carmody, 1998, 320; Gibbon, 1995, 8-10). It is this retarded growth that tempted the 
state to succumb to the persuasion of IMF and the World Bank and introduce the 
economic structural adjustment program (ESAP). Another factor behind the adoption of 
ESAP was the involvement of many state ministers "in commercial farming - the main 
sector to benefit from ESAP", (Dashwood cited in Carmody, 1998, 321). 
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The outcomes of market liberalization under ESAP were disastrous for the 
general populace and manufacturing sector though contributing to the emergence of more 
bourgeois actors especially in finance. "Financial liberalization and tight credit policies 
meant higher interest rates on domestic debt (up to 30%); currency devaluation, increased 
foreign debt payments; [and] firm closures reduced tax-take" (Carmody, 1998, 327-28). 
The deliberate measures to orient both the manufacturing and agricultural industry 
towards export production were at the cost of consumer goods, resulting in increased rate 
of consumer price inflation. Removal of subsidies and unrestricted competition placed 
pressure on local industries resulting in closures and job cuts. This, coupled with 
government's down sizing of the civil service among other government spending 
reduction mechanisms saw plummeting levels of employment. Percentage of households 
living in poverty increased from 61% in 1995 to 75% in 2000 (Raftopoulos and 
Phimister, 2004, 358). 
Perhaps in anticipation of the negative outcomes of ESAP on the poor, the ESAP 
policy document had a long annex entitled 'Assessing and Addressing Social Dimensions 
of ESAP'. This annex stipulated measures to cushion the populace against the impacts of 
"retrenchments, higher inflation levels and removal of subsidies", among other things 
that would come with the reform (Gibbon, 1995, 11). It set out a gendered program, 
foreseeing that women would be hardest hit by these negative outcomes of re-training 
and was later complimented by the setting up of the 'Employment and Training Fund' 
meant to promote and support "self-employment projects in the urban informal sector and 
public works projects in rural areas" (12). Consequentially, policies that promoted 
entrance into the informal economy as a 'survival enclave' for the retrenched poor 
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became part of the ESAP reform package. This phenomenon can be ascribed to and was 
an expression of the 'schizophrenic' nature of the Zimbabwe state. Until its official 
jettisoning in 1995 the ESAP was thus interjected by partial reversions to welfarist 
policies, especially on health and education. Subsequent post ESAP economic reforms, 
especially prior to 2000, though increasingly glossed by a redistributive rhetoric did not 
significantly depart from the neo-liberal 'common sense' (see Gramsci's sense of 
common sense in Simon, 1982, 63-64) that informed ESAP. One could suggest that 
ESAP was a failed compromise; like most compromises of this sort it was bound to leave 
both ends of the diametrical opposed sides dissatisfied. 
What emerged from the failure of ESAP was a new national consensus around a 
broad 'developmentalist agenda' typified by the emergence of a strong social movement 
which conceived the MDC. The worsening economic hardships of the late 1990s 
completed the process of awakening of workers and peasants from the illusions of 
independence euphoria. For the workers, the high rates of poverty were directly traceable 
to the state's alliance with capital that had conceived ESAP. To the peasants the 
increased rural poverty and other economic hardships served to remind them of the 
unfinished business of land redistribution and restitution. According to Raftopoulos et al 
(2004, 362) the "largely spontaneous land occupations in Svosve, Mashonaland East in 
1998" was a result of the growing rural poverty. The occupations were squashed by the 
government. 
The encouragement of private accumulation of capital under ESAP had given 
birth to largely elite indigenization groups such as Affirmative Action Group (AAG), 
Indigenous Business Women Organisation (IBWO) and the Indigenous Business 
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Development Centre (IBDC). The increasingly growing militant former liberation war 
fighters association was aligned to these groups. These, though sharing membership with 
the ruling party started to put more pressure on the state to do more. According to 
Raftopoulos and Phimister (2004, 261) these groups became an important launching pad 
for ruling party politicians. This trend, found at early stages of Zimbabwe's current 
politico-economic crisis may thus be argued to have given direction to the increased 
centrality of the party and state in the accumulation process and the blurred relationship 
thereof in the post 2000 accumulation modes. While for the aforementioned classes, the 
state did not do enough, white capital still perceived the state's policies as ambiguous at 
the least and hence could not be relied on. 
Though the economy had been on a downward trend the year 1997 was decisive 
and set in motion an uninterrupted downward spiral from which Zimbabwe has never 
recovered. The war veterans, workers and peasants became even more agitated as evinced 
by the unprecedented civil unrest during that year and subsequent years. The failed 1998 
donor conference and the 2000 rejection of the draft constitution, which had an 
'important' land clause in it, turned out to be the two last opportunities for organized land 
reform to avert the immanent rupture and descent into a violent and unregulated mode of 
land acquisition. More and more increasingly; 
a growing black elite with close ties to the government sought greater access to land, with a view 
towards restructuring ownership in its own interest. After independence in 1980, members of the 
state elite, including ministers, judges, senior army officers, parliamentarians and civil servants, 
had all quietly enriched themselves by leasing state land on favourable terms, but, in the changed 
context of the structural adjustment programme's market driven approach, circumspection was 
thrown to the wind. ... Class formation no longer needed to proceed behind closed doors 
(Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004, 363). 
In fact as the 2000 fast track land reform and the subsequent crisis unfolded this class of 
accumulators became so intertwined with the state that one can hardly separate the two, 
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functionally or otherwise. This is not surprising considering the petty bourgeois pattern 
historically embedded in Zimbabwe's ruling elite and now "as the moral legitimacy of 
this elite has been eroded, so its core economic ambition has come to dominate the state's 
political imperatives' (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004, 362). 
This chapter has thus drawn the broad context within which the post 2000 
situation unfolded. The year 2000 was a tipping moment for the state-white capital 
relationship. One outcome of the 1990s economic downturn and state's response to the 
challenges thereof was a realignment of social classes. This is explored further in the next 
chapter. This will demonstrate how the breakdown of state alliance with white capital and 
the dominance of the petty bourgeois culture in ZANU-PF have interacted with 
Zimbabwe's economic crisis to produce a highly unregulated form of accumulation 
characterised by the increased salience of the state and ruling party in an authoritarian 
populist fashion. The chapter does this on a broader panoramic plane thereby laying the 
foundation for the subsequent chapter that looks more incisively at how these unregulated 
forms of accumulation have fertilized illegal gold mining and trade. 
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Chapter 3: 
The Post-2000 Crisis and the Informalisation of Production 
Introduction 
Historically, and as noted in the previous chapter, the state's responses to crisis moments, 
more specifically in the colonial period, were characterised by reliance on commandist 
rigidly regulated policy/legal interventions designed to advantage a white accumulating 
class. Various enabling laws were enacted, state led coercive measures taken, production 
targets set, protectionist measures implemented and other interventionist measures 
established to commandeer a racially configured wealth accumulation pattern. Alluding 
to the need for the present government to regulate economic activity and learn from 
Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) government's handling of 
economic sanctions, Zimbabwe's reserve bank Governor Gono pointed out that 
Rhodesians 
were disciplined as economic actors and had law and order regulations which people defied at 
their own peril in those dark days ... there was a big whip for indiscipline, there was intolerance 
for ineptitude, dislike for the lazy and an abomination for the corrupt regardless of position in 
society. There was total obedience to authority and accountability for one's day in the office, in 
the field and the factory floor. We need the same entrepreneurial values even today (July 2006, 
20). 
Notwithstanding Gono's uncritical glorification of the UDI system, the rigid 
formalization and regulation which he calls for has been absent in the post-2000 crisis 
period. Instead, the state's populist measures initially meant to ensure ZANU-PF's 
continued stay in power in the wake of pressure from labour and war veterans as seen in 
Mugabe's approval of farm invasions set the tone for a violent and unregulated form of 
accumulation charactering the period. ZANU-PF responded to pressure from the ex-
liberation fighters by assenting to their demands and co-opting them into a militant 
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political survival and economic strategy. This has dominated Zimbabwe's ruling party 
modus operandi since 2000. The post-2000 period has been dominated by informal and 
extra-legal wealth making activities, serious policy inconsistencies with respect to these 
activities on the part of the Zimbabwe government and the involvement of those 
connected to the state in these activities. Accumulation rivalry lines within ZANU-PF 
and among those connected to the state have deepened. 
That the war veterans managed to bulldoze their demands set an important 
precedent that powerful social forces outside the state exist. The liberation war 
credentials and allegiance to the ruling party became synonymous with this power. To be 
sure, a state of a different type emerged; an 'ultra party state', an intricate intertwining of 
party and state and individuals within party and state. A new generation of 'war veterans' 
emerged; unemployed and redundant ZANU-PF youths soon found a new vocation in 
seizing white owned commercial farms (not necessarily for themselves but in many cases 
for government ministers, party leaders, and powerful new forces within the 'war 
veterans' association) and subsequently in terror campaigns against party opponents thus 
'zealously saving the party', in effect a 'party state'. Most of these young members of 
party militias40, too young to have participated in the 1970s liberation war called 
themselves war veterans of the 'Third Chimurenga' (a name used by ZANU-PF to refer 
to 2000 land invasions). 
This degeneration into unregulated, informalised and often violent modes of 
wealth accrual did not end with land grabs but was soon to spread to other sectors. By 
sidelining the rule of law during the 2000 land grabs the state lost the moral stand to 
40 Whilst is has been common to state that these are party youth it is worthwhile to interpose that this has 
not been always the case, in some instances these may just be unemployed youths rented for specific acts of 
violence by specific individuals in ZANU-PF. 
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consistently enforce laws and policy, especially when it came to war veterans and some 
of the petty bourgeois elements within its ranks. The centre of power in Zimbabwe 
shifted to the party from the state - though now it is seemingly slipping away to the 
military, as epitomized by the establishment of the Joint Operation Command (JOC) 
(Mugabe's think tank comprising of the army, intelligence, prisons service and police) 
and its increasingly central role in policy formulation and implementation. Nevertheless, 
and because the party runs the state, the state has been maintained as an instrument of 
both economic and political reproduction. It is for this reason that I invoke the notion of 
'party state'. 
This chapter looks at the events charactering the post-2000 period to make a case 
for an argument centered on the increased centrality of the 'party state', the informalised 
pattern of accumulation, its violent turns, and disorders, lack of regulation and very 
importantly, the involvement of the ruling elite in this process. Having started with a 
broader outlook the chapter will narrow towards the Totororo Illegal Gold mining case 
study and establish its place within this broader context. 
Informalisation of Production 
Prior to the teething of the crisis in 1997, the ruling ZANU-PF/white capital alliance may 
(with some qualification) befit Gramsci's 'historic bloc', a hegemonic alliance between 
classes, (Morton, 2003, 155; Simon, 1982, 26-27) that had evolved in the aftermath of 
198041. It may be said that the rise of indigenization movements in the mid to late 1990s 
41 The invocation of Gramsci's nortion of 'historic bloc' suggests a hegemonic construction. This is not 
without potential misgivings. As Moore (2006) argues ZANU-PF has hardly ever ruled with 'active consent 
of Zimbabwe's contending classes and groups' which hegemony would entail. On strict application, the 
usage of the 'notion' thus accepts this limitation. It is restrictedly referred to, 'in passing', for its utility in 
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was a challenge to this 'historic bloc' (Phimister and Raftopoulos, 2004, 360-361). This 
alliance had seen the ruling party doing little to alter the colonially bequeathed 
accumulation structure. Some members of the elite entered into accumulation pacts with 
capital to either further their private accumulation projects or for 'technocratic realistic' 
reasons. The links between the ruling party, its companies and some white capitalists 
such as Tiny Rowland, the Oppenheimer family, Jayant Joshi, Tony O'Reilly, Algy 
Cluff, John Bredenkamp, Muller Rautenbach, Nicholas van Hoogstraten (see list of 
characters on page viii) continue to this day, ironically at a time the party is said to have 
fallen out with white capital: this process is residual of the post-1980 'historic bloc'. 
Interestingly, a counter alliance was emerging involving labour and the country's 
liberation fighters. The ZANU-PF/labour alliance had been strained since the attempt to 
create a one party state in 1989, and worsened after the ESAP disagreements. The white 
farmer's support for the MDC marked the end of their alliance with ZANU-PF42, while 
ZANU-PF's desperate populist embrace of war veterans' demands saw it aligning with 
war veterans and peasants through the Zimbabwe Farmers Union (ZFU)43. Two 
formations' 'blocs' emerging from the crisis can be drawn as the ZANU-PF/war 
veterans/peasants on one hand and MDC/Labour/civil society/White Commercial farmers 
on the other. 
portraying the shifts in ZANU-PF class alliances. Considering the authoritarian populist modus vivendi one 
may refer to it as minimal hegemony, not society-wide but within the elite (Femia, 1980). However this is 
fracturing as well as signified by the cracks within ZANU-PF and former finance minister Simba Makoni's 
decision to challenge President Mugabe for the March 29 election. 
42 The white farmers' alliance with the MDC started in the campaign against the draft constitutiona towards 
the February 2000 referendum. The NCA and newly formed MDC were campaigning for a NO vote which 
coincided with the farmers' position against the land clause in the constitution, which was going to see 
government having more power to acquire land from them. 
43 ZFU was established to represent mainly black rural farmers. It was active alongside war vets in the land 
reform. In any case the union is largely controlled by war vets. 
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It is argued here that the cessation of ties between ZANU-PF ruling elites and 
white capital marks the first instance towards the informalisation of production. To start 
with, ZANU-PF's reluctant shift to ally with ex-combatants and peasants created an 
ideological dilemma for a party hitherto dominated by a more or less liberally inclined 
petty bourgeois tradition. Simultaneously the ex-combatants, having been galvanized 
upon the platform of redistribution, exuded prima facie leftist propensities, making the 
alliance a disharmonious mix. Mugabe had to resort to his talk-left-walk-right mastery; 
this, bearing in mind that hitherto white capital had relied on a formalized structure of 
production whose contours had been drawn in their favour. The alliance got to be 
sustained by a rhetoric that meant refraining from enforcing the obtaining legal order that 
had protected white capital. The often contradictory statements coming from ZANU-PF 
leadership in government at the onset of land invasions are indicative of these 
contradictions. For instance, Vice-President Joseph Msika would order the land-grabs to 
stop while Mugabe would justify the seizures, though sometimes giving contradictory 
signals. At one point in 2000 Msika, in Mugabe's absence, ordered the invasions to stop 
only to see his order ignored at Mugabe's return (Winter, 2000). Despite Mugabe not 
saying anything publicly, there was speculation that he secretly gave a go ahead to the 
invasions. 
Besides the impetus set by the 2000 land grabs, the liberalization tenets of ESAP 
and the negative effects thereof had also set in motion a trend towards a more 
informahsed mode of wealth accrual. It has been noted earlier that the high levels of 
unemployment and the accompanying 'liberalization of production' saw the redundant 
workers being accommodated into the informal economy (Meager cited in Gibbon, 1995, 
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24; Mawowa, 2006, 1). As mentioned above, though the gradual swelling of the informal 
sector from ESAP years is noticeable, the post-2000 growth of this sector was 
unprecedented. A study of Mbare women vendors in 2006 for instance revealed that 
"most of the women entered into vending after the year 1997 and progressively ... 
towards 2006" (Mawowa, 2006, 27). Cross border trade became more common with most 
people opting out of formal employment to engage in trade into neighbouring countries 
South Africa, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana, while company executives resorted to 
hawking in order to supplement their inflation eroded salaries (The Standard, 8 July 
2007, 8). 
Increases in parallel market activity such as foreign currency dealing, illicit gold 
mining, and trade epitomize this trend. Other activities include trade in basic 
commodities such as bread, maize meal, cooking oil and sugar market' to airtime voucher 
cards on the 'black market'. For example, reports are that while ZANU-PF's Bulawayo 
leadership was denying claims that the party was selling cell phone lines on the black 
market, Net-one44 cell phone lines were sold at between Z$6 - Z$8 million on the parallel 
market compared to the Z$300 000 official price (Chronicle, 13 July 2007, 2). Parallel 
forex dealings have been steered by ruling party stalwarts. The unregulated sale of 
consumer commodities has been exacerbated by the incessant shortages of basic 
commodities. For instance, the limited supplies of electricity and resultant power cuts 
accentuated by the state's diversion of supplies to winter wheat crop farmers in June 2007 
increased the reliance on and selling of firewood, mostly from farms acquired under the 
land occupations. Instead of concentrating on farming as the core business, some of the 
44 Net-one is a parastatal mobile cellular phone provider and for that reason has a close link to the state. It is 
one of the three mobile and cellular phone operators, which include Econet and Telecel. 
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beneficiaries resorted to spending most of their time selling firewood (IRIN, 1 July 2007, 
8). 
This trend has not escaped the attention of newspaper cartoonists. Below is a 
caricature of an emergent informal marketer selling meat, resulting from meat shortages 
due to disruption of commercial farming activities. The cartoon mocks Obert Mpofu's 
(Minister of Industry and International Trade) decision to allow the entry of private 
unlicensed abattoirs into the meat trade. This is an admittance of the collapse of the Cold 
Storage Company (CSC), which is legally responsibly for all meat business in the 
country. It speaks the eclipsing of formal production by the informal. 
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It would be beneficial at this point to illustrate how this economy of shortages has 
played out, and the dominant mode of wealth accumulation it has produced. The 
disruption of commercial farming activities led not only to low beef production but dairy 
and wheat production fell as well. Over the past seven years shortages in meat, bread and 
milk products have thus been a common feature. In 2002 a man in Chegutu (102km 
southwest of Harare) then working as a driver and salesman for Dairibord Zimbabwe 
Limited45 was making more money from the bribes than through his wage. Retailers paid 
him to ensure he constantly supplied them with dairy products then in short supply. He 
started to divert some of the milk supplies for his own private parallel market sales. 
The man was earning enough from the unofficial sales to quit his job and start his 
own grocery business. Links with his former company employees ensured him a 
continuous supply of milk. At the same time, while bread was in short supply he struck a 
deal with a Central Bakery (based in Kadoma, 30km south of Chegutu) bread delivery 
truck driver, who was also operating informal grocery shops of his own. The former 
45 DZL is formerly government owned, now privatized (to a member of the ruling party elite) with a near 
monopoly over the production and distribution of dairy products in Zimbabwe. 
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businessman would pay in cash or by bartering milk products. This arrangement was so 
lucrative that he would earn as much a 300% - 500% in profit selling bread and milk at 
informal market rates. For example, he would buy bread for $13 and sell it for $50. His 
advantage spread to other commodities that were in short supply such as sugar, cooking 
oil and mealie meal46. When the police tried to clamp down on the parallel market selling 
of bread he would pay them off. Before the 2007 price control blitz47 he had purchased a 
farm (for which he recently received a tractor from the government under the agriculture 
mechanization program), a trucking company and six grocery shops, gained directly by 
manipulating the crisis. Unfortunately for him the groceries shortages emanating from the 
price blitz since June 2007 has forced him to close four of his supermarkets. 
The above case is just one of several of the rags to riches - and sometimes back 
again - stories that have dominated Zimbabwe's economy of crisis. Similar patterns are 
found in the illegal gold trade. Other cases include those of fuel attendants who have 
made a fortune from bribes and selling the scarce fuel at inflated prices in the parallel 
markets. At face value, it may be said that not all of these cases have had help from the 
golden hand of the 'party state'. A closer look, however, points to the salience of the 
state. Where the party-accumulation-nexus has not been conspicuous, the role of state 
functionaries such as the police has been clear. In fact in the bread and milk sales case 
above, the operator brags about having good links in political circles, thus 'hapana 
zvavanondiita1 (they will do nothing to me). Moreover, that this man benefited from the 
46 Mealie meal is a powder made from ground maize grain and is used to make Sadza, Zimbabwe's staple 
meal. 
47 On 18 June 2007 the Zimbabwe government decreed prize freezes on all commodities predated to 14 
June 2007. Since 2000 the government has half-heartedly relied on imposing price controls to try to contain 
inflation. This is more of a 'public relations' exercise whose effects has been to worsen the problem of 
shortages. 
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highly patronized state's agricultural mechanization program owes to a combination of 
merit and his connectedness, now that he is among the top ten highest grain producers in 
Mashonaland West. However, the above case poses questions as to the regression or 
otherwise of the new patterns of accumulation unfolding in the post-2000 crisis. Are 
these cases exceptions to the generally perceived and evinced trend toward the 
destruction of capital as Rob Davis would suggest (2004)? There appears, as shall be 
demonstrated in the concluding chapter, to be a new type of capital generating from the 
ruins of the former. 
Besides what seems to be an effort by the state to formalize and order these 
accumulation trends through police clampdown and half hazard insistence on trading 
licenses and registration, inter alia these trends are far from decreasing. They are 
blooming. Clearly thus, the legacy of the farm invasions has been to set in motion a 
disordered mode of accumulation, wherein party allegiance is central in laying claim to 
property and economic means. As shall be shown below the state/party state has become 
increasingly centralised with the deepening of the economic and political crisis. 
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(see footnote 9) sit during the day awaiting for fuel clients. The fuel is stocked behind the 
shops. 
The deepening crisis and the centrality of the 'party state' 
"[There are] three vices weighing down the economy ... indiscipline, corruption and 
speculation ... added to these, another vice called bureaucratic inertia" (Gono, July 
2006, 14). 
The endemic crisis has seen the state becoming a crucial and central vehicle for 
accumulation in an unprecedented manner. This centrality has expressed itself fivefold; 
1. Shortages characterizing the crisis have forced the state to intervene in order to 
moderate the appropriation of goods/'basics' in short supply to try to ensure even 
distribution and that such appropriation is in line with 'party/national priorities'. 
2. Allegiance to the ruling party, a legacy of the politically driven violent land 
invasion of 2000 and previous patterns of client-patronage, has been used as pre-
conditionality for one to benefit from this appropriation. 
3. This state's centrality has seen those connected to it seeking to further 
instrumentalise it. This has often not been without internal competition (in the 
form of factions within the party and military), making dependency on the state 
for accumulation self reinforcing and more entrenched. 
4. In a state defined, as and by the ruling party, those that have instrumentalised the 
state have further - and deliberately - fused the ruling party with the state. The 
state and the party have become more and more undifferentiated. The privileged 
access to the state is used to legitimate claims based on a narrow exclusionist 
doctrine of patriotism meant to disqualify those in the opposition. 
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5. The increased centrality of the state in the appropriation of scarce economic and 
political goods has served to sustain a patronage based form of accumulation and 
retention of power by the ruling party. 
The state's salience expresses itself through Gideon Gono's appropriation of 
foreign currency, as well as state acquired farming seeds and implements such as 
combine harvesters, tractors inter alia, down to Chiefs demanding party cards while 
giving donor food hand outs, and ZANU-PF youths controlling a bread queue. It goes 
even further to Mugabe's youth militia and police distributing civic goods like the right to 
worship, ordering people to chant party slogans, or produce party cards in order to pass 
through road blocks. This breaks into organized and individualized militia for ZANU-PF 
party chiefs controlling access to resources like panning sites and farming land. One may 
note this is a sign of a decentralized authoritarian political economy. In food distribution 
to the starving masses, membership and connection to the ruling party has become a pre-
requisite for would-be beneficiaries. The same goes for fuel distribution and farming 
inputs. For example in May 2007 Water and Infrastructural Development Minister 
Munacho Mutezo ordered twenty MDC supporters who were members of an irrigation 
scheme to halt winter planting as part of a purge of opposition supporters in the area 
(Nyathi, 2007). One of the victims recounted; "We were ordered not to plant any crops 
this winter season. They are saying we should get land from [MDC leader Morgan] 
Tsvangirai and start our own schemes and stop benefiting from ZANU PF's revolutionary 
sweat". 
The above scenario is indicative of the 'hegemonic' notion that for one to be a 
'beneficiary' [of 'liberation'] one must adhere to the ideology that ZANU-PF cadres have 
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exclusive ownership of ZANU-PF's 'revolutionary sweat'. This doctrine is enforced 
invariably through Zimbabwe's military and police on one hand, and ZANU-PF youth 
structures on the other. It is a doctrine that resonates with threats of a coup if MDC wins 
the March 2008 elections, as army Brigadier General David Sigauke reminisced on his 
retired chief Zvinavashe's similar threat in 2002 (Kaseke, 2007). The same doctrine saw 
John Nkomo (ZANU-PF National Chairperson and former Speaker of parliament), 
replicating George Orwell's Animal Farm notion that 'other comrades (animals) are 
more equal than others', when he muscled out a black farmer and ZANU-PF member, 
Langton Masunda from a 611,79 hectare game-rich formerly white owned farm, situated 
in Lupane area, some 200km north west of Bulawayo (Ian Nhuka, 13 July 2006). In 
another of these many cases, a high ranking member of the ruling party attempted to seize 
a fuel station in Chegutu owned by a black Zimbabwean. The owner was only saved 
when the ruling party official realized that he also had top connections in the party 
(Anonymous 8, Interview, 2007). 
The above trend can not be divorced from Finance Minister Mumbengegwi's 
(2007, 6-7) complaints in parliament about those making a fortune out of Zimbabwe's 
misery. 
One of the consequences of the above challenges, Mr Speaker Sir, is the emergence of very large 
income disparities, with the majority of the lowest paid workers earning below the Poverty Datum 
Line. This, Honourable Members, is happening at a time when a small proportion of the 
population is now accumulating wealth overnight, in part benefiting from the price distortions 
arising from some of the policies and facilities meant to protect the very poor. Regrettably some 
of the wealth accumulation is a direct product of the prevailing indiscipline in our economy. We 
have amongst the citizens, individuals benefiting from abuse of public resources and thereby 
contributing to unnecessary public expenditures and economic hardship. 
Ironically, not long after this budget announcement the Zimbabwe government went on 
an ill-planned price control blitz of a form comparable to the June 2005 'Operation 
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Restore Order', further compounding the problem of 'price distortions'. Just after a 
government directive for fuel to be sold at Z$60 000 per liter, shortages ensued with the 
liquid only easily available on the parallel market at prices as high as between Z$400 000 
and $500 000 a liter (Zimbabwe Independent, July 13-19, 2007, 11). Mumbengegwi's 
"small proportion" known to be "accumulating wealth overnight", and more apparently 
those "benefiting from abuse of public resources" are largely those within the state. These 
are people with access to cheap foreign currency - only available with connections to the 
state, who buy the American dollar from RBZ at a controlled rate of US$1 to Z$30 000 
and resell it on parallel market at US$1 to Z$2, 5 million (Daily Mail, January 19 2008). 
These are the same people also able by virtue of their positions to connive with the price 
monitoring agents to take advantage of price distortions emanating from the raids on 
shops. 
In July 2007 the Sunday Mail reported that foreign currency dealers were making 
as much as Z$30 million (approx R2000 at parallel market exchange rate) a day when 
most professionals were earning less than Z$5 million (approximately R333) a month 
(Moyo, 2007, 5). If these dealers, most of whom act as agents of big party and 
government chefs are making this much, it is not difficult to imagine how much the 
'comrades in business' like ex-liberation war commander Solomon Mujuru and former 
ZANU-PF provincial chair, and former Chinhoyi (town about 102km east of Harare) 
Member of Parliament and Mugabe's relative Philip Chiyangwa are making through their 
parallel market foreign currency dealers in the streets. With the price blitz that started on 
the 26th of June 2007, those connected to the price monitoring commission were alerting 
their friends and relatives of the next business they were going to 'invade' and force to 
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sell goods at ludicrously low and unprofitable prices. Many of ZANU-PF's 'politically 
corrects' bought these goods at these give away prices, only to later sell them at inflated 
prices on the unofficial market. 
The state's system of distribution of goods in short supply is so skewed and easy 
to manipulate that each attempt seems to have been designed to ensure benefits for 
members of the party elite. For example, in 2005 the state run Grain Marketing Board 
(GMB) was selling grain to millers at a lower rate than it was purchasing from farmers. 
In a mode of appropriation defined by patronage lines, only those millers connected to 
the party could easily access this cheap grain. It soon emerged that most of these were 
disguised millers, who accessed this grain from the GMB only to repack and resell the 
very same grain to the GMB at a profit. 
Similarly, at a time when fuel takes more forex than any other commodity (Gono, 
2005, 16), those connected to the state are getting fuel ostensibly for priority programs 
like public transport and agriculture only to sell it at inflated parallel market prices. As 
one informant put it, "with fuel in short supply the war vets/CIOs (Central Intelligence 
Organisation operatives) now owning farms around Chegutu, though spending all their 
time sitting here [at a beer bar], claim government fuel ostensibly to use at their farms, 
only to sell it here through these 'NOCZIM48 guys' on the black market" (Anonymous 
10, Interview, July 2007). As a result, "NOCZIMs" (as seen in Figure 4), abound in 
Chegutu and across the country where fuel is consistently available, albeit at exorbitant 
parallel market rates, despite shortages in official channels. A similar trend is noticeable 
48 'NOCZIM' is now local lingua franca for illegal and parallel market fuel dealers, derogatorily derived 
from the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM), which is officially responsible for all national 
oil procurement. In effect these have become the de-facto National oil supplies because they always have 
fuel to sell. 
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in the RBZ allocation of foreign currency at a very cheap 'official' rate. This limited 
currency is accessed by party 'heavies', who in turn make huge profits by selling the 
same money at the higher parallel market rate. Commenting on this, Mutumwa Mawere49 
notes that"... selected individuals can benefit from buying foreign exchange at Z$15,000 
to US$1 and then sell the same US$1 at Zim$25,000 or more" (2007). 
Reports abound about people connected to the state's involvement in the parallel 
money market. In mid-2007 the Standard reported a senior police official employing five 
young men to sell foreign currency on the streets at a time when police 'play[ed] cat and 
mouse with illegal dealers' (8 July 2008, 8). One of the young men is quoted as saying: 
We sell the foreign currency openly because we are untouchable. Some constables arrested me at 
one time, even though I had informed them that I was working for their boss. They have been 
transferred from Harare and after that no one dares to touch us. 
The article goes on to note that besides dealing in foreign currency the police official also 
has other 'employees' who vend vegetables, cigarettes and cell phones confiscated from 
unauthorized vendors during police raids. 
An incident in Chegutu in which a son of a ZANU-PF stalwart and former 
Chegutu acting town clerk, Zinyowera, who acquired a farm under the fast track land 
reform exercise, shows the dirty game of accumulation in Zimbabwe politics. 
Zinyowera's son had drawn out a pistol during a quarrel with a friend over the sharing of 
dividends from fuel sales on the parallel market, leading to the police investigating where 
he had obtained the gun. The investigation revealed a number of issues. The farm, 
thought to belong to Zinyowera, was actually owned by a government minister; the 
former was being used as a front. When the son discovered that the farm was not his 
49 Mawere is a Zimbabwean businessmen and former owner of two mining companies in Zimbabwe. He 
was forced to flee to South Africa after a fall out with ZANU-PF, which had helped him start his mining 
business. 
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father's he with assistance from friends in Chegutu town, started stealing implements. 
They smuggled about 1800 liters of diesel fuel and seven electric motors - leading to the 
collapse of the water system. He also stole his father's pistol. The minister and the father 
ordered the arrest of his son and his friends. They were arrested and beaten, but were 
released without being charged after the son threatened to divulge more information. 
A former farming hub, Chegutu has now seen most of its agro-businesses being 
closed as most of its surrounding farms and mines have been taken over by CIO 
operatives, War Veterans, ministers, and ZANU-PF heavyweights. Savana Mine and 
Chakari gold mines are now being run by an alliance of CIO operatives, ministers and 
War Veterans. So is the Game Park and Reserve Farm in Mhondoro Ngezi, also in the 
proximity of Chegutu town. It has been reportedly taken over by Vice President Mujuru 
and her husband, who have also been allegedly involved in illegal gold panning in the 
same area (Anonymous 9, Interview, 2007). Currently, the ZANU-PF scheme of 
beneficiation in Chegutu has been extended to party activists who are now being given 
small scale mining licenses to mine gold in areas around Chegutu50. This started under 
the women in mining initiative but is now 'open to everyone'. This is, however, a power 
retention project - it appeases party supporters and lures the general citizenry through a 
delusive promise of income generation. The levels of production have in these farms and 
mines fallen drastically. It is this destructive and apparently regressive outcome of the 
2000 land invasions that has given reason to designate this process 'dis-accumulation' 
(Davies, 2004). 
Also see the list of characters for a more detailed list of members of the ruling elite and their connections 
have benefited from party-state and their involvement in extra legal economic activities. 
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Violence and Warlordsim 
The violent manner through which the 'land reform program' was carried out set the tone 
for the violence that has characterised accumulation in the post-2000 crisis period. 
Though 'blessed by the state', the land occupations (even the recent ones) were not 
regulated by formal state structures. Informalised violence has been central in gaining 
and retaining property. This deregulated nature of appropriation means that there is no 
clear coordination on the part of those in the party. This makes clashes unavoidable. 
Moreover the invasions were not always led by party activists per se, or even the war vets 
and peasant masses. Rather, there has been a tendency for ZANU-PF's high ranking 
officials to hire 'party activists' (or youths in the name of the party). In Mashonaland 
Central for instance, soon after conquest several of the white farms occupied by the so-
called party activists/war vets/peasants were delivered to the respective ZANU-PF 
officials, the real force behind this process. Now many farms are named after their new 
'owners', such as Goche Farm (former minister of state security), Manyika Farm 
(ZANU-PF political commissar), Mahachi Farm (late defense minister), Chihuri Farm 
(police commissioner) and Makasha Farm (a ZANU-PF provincial leader). Some of the 
people who led the invasions work for these officials on these farms. 
Not only has this use of militia and violence been targeted at white owned farms. 
Increasingly, senior ZANU-PF leaders are clashing among themselves. In 2006, two 
government ministers clashed over a citrus plantation in Chegutu. The white owner of the 
plantation, popularly known as Biti, was a ZANU-PF supporter. He often sponsored 
ZANU-PF campaigns, rallies, meetings and feasts, slaughtering cattle at party functions. 
In 2005 he nearly represented the ruling party in Chegutu's mayoral elections, had it not 
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been for his skin colour. He was later dropped in favour of Alois Majiri. This was said to 
be a 'strategic move' that would show consistency for a party that often plays the racial 
card against its main rival the MDC, criticizing it for aligning with 'whites'. The Deputy 
Minister of Information Bright Matonga (a nephew of President Mugabe) organized a 
militia gang to occupy Biti's plantation. Instead of using the police to stop him, Webster 
Shamu (a close ally of Mugabe and then Minister of Special Affairs in the President's 
Office) organized youths - paying them Z$1000 each - to drive off Matonga's gang at 
night. The group burnt down the makeshift grass encampments of Matonga's sponsored 
invaders and damaged a car. They were arrested after one of them was caught by police 
and leaked information. However, they were released on Attorney General Sobuza Gula 
Ndebele's orders (Anonymous 8, interview, September 2006). The issue drew in a lot of 
ZANU-PF stalwarts who took different positions, though they would not come out 
publicly. Eventually Matonga managed to wrestle half of the orange farm from the 
original white owner Biti, who remained with the other half. This has negatively affected 
the quality of oranges being produced. Formerly grown for export, the oranges are now 
being sold in the informal markets in Chegutu. 
In April 2007 Gideon Gono's farm was burnt. Media speculation contends that 
this was orchestrated by those within his party ZANU-PF involved in illegal currency 
deals and opposed to his currency reforms. 
The fire broke out at Gono's farm in Norton, 40km from the capital Harare on Friday, four days 
after Gono said Zimbabweans had less than a month to hand in small amounts of old banknotes to 
the banks. The [Sunday] Mail also raised fears for Gono's life by reporting on a mystery "armed 
gang of smartly dressed men" driving in a "4x4 double cab vehicle" which is said to have caused 
chaos at Gono's flower project in Norton on Thursday. The men are said to have asked for the 
governor's residential address before beating a hasty retreat following confrontation with security 
staff. A day after the incident, the paper reported, a fire swept its way through the bank chiefs 
maize crop, spreading to neighbouring farms (Newzimbabwe.com accessed on 1 May 2007). 
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The style of attack mirrors those on opposition members by state secret agencies. A 
month earlier, the publication observed, Mugabe had remarked that there were senior 
party officials who wanted Gono dead because of his anti-corruption and anti-inflation 
drive. In the previous year Gono, who owns another farm on the north eastern fringes of 
Harare, had prophesied, "... some will use their ill gotten wealth to sponsor general 
disorder and target malice at the Governor and his team as a way of venting anger at our 
policies" (July 2006, 18). However Gono was adamant, "... there is no amount of 
intimidation that will force me to abandon the task at hand. I will not let the presidium 
and the majority of the people of Zimbabwe down", and for that he paid. This suggests 
that whoever is/are locked in the accumulation 'war' with Gono also has links with and 
can use the national secret service to their personal ends. If not, then it is even more 
worrying that individuals within the ruling party are having not only organized militia, 
but secret mafias and intelligence units with the capacity to carry out covert acts of terror. 
In some cases the warlordism-accumulation connection may not come out so 
obviously. An example is the Mukono case, in which a ZANU-PF war vet was killed, 
allegedly by fellow party members referred to as Mutasa 'supporters'. However, this 
group consisted of more than party members. It was also a personal militia belonging to, 
funded, and supported by Mutasa. This is a feature now endemic within ZANU-PF 
(Manyukwe, July 12-18 2007, 4). These militias can be permanent individual supporters 
and party activists, or are hired for a particular 'mission'. The war vet murdered by 
'fellow ZANU-PF members' was accorded a provincial hero status51. He had been 
51 One may wonder why he was accorded provincial hero status when he was an enemy of Mutasa. 
Principally, being enemies with Mutasa would not take away his Hero status. Moreover the fractions in 
ZANU-PF mean that Mutasa would not have easily had his way. In addition this must not be surprising in a 
country where three brigadiers, all suspected of involvement in a foiled military coup (Brigadiers General 
- 6 8 -
accused of stealing from a farm belonging to Mutasa's close colleague obtained under the 
land grabs. 
The wave of farm seizures in Karoi and Macheke in the year 2007, by the 
military, with junior soldiers occupying farms in behalf of senior commanders 
underscores the salience of informal coercion in the post-2000 accumulation trends. It is 
indicative of an unending process of primitive accumulation. These invasions have not 
only driven off the few remaining white farmers but also black Zimbabweans and other 
low ranking ZANU-PF members that had occupied the farms at the height of land 
invasions in 2000 and 2001. As shall be seen in the next chapter these trends of warlord 
type accumulation manifest more viciously in the illegal gold mining activities. This 
ranges from miners clashing with police as the latter attempt to stop illegal activities, to 
clashes between local residents and 'outsiders' over mining rights, to conflicts between 
gangsters over access to mining sites. 
Crisis and Party-State 'Schizophrenia' 
Earlier in this work reference has been made to Ibbo Mandaza's 1986 analysis of post 
colonial Zimbabwe in which he invoked Yash Tandon's 'Schizophrenic State'. The 
schizophrenia emanated from the fact that the ruling petty bourgeoisie had to safe guard 
white capitalist interests on whose material base it relied on, on one hand, and the need to 
live up to the promissory nuances of liberation which would entail a redistributionist 
welfarist approach on the other. To add to this, the acquisitive interests of the state 
managers had to compete with their umpire role. The sum of all this has been a state that 
Paul Armstrong Gunda, Brigadier General Fakazi Muleya and Brigadier General Gideon Lifa) died in a 
space of one month and are accorded national hero status (Zimbabwe Standard 22 July 2007, 1). 
- 6 9 -
wavers back and forth in its policies and actions. As the present analysis of the post-2000 
crisis continues, it can be said with certainty that the 'schizophrenic state' lives on. This 
however ought to be put into perspective as it now transcends protecting white capital. It 
can be better accounted for by the elites' bid to tap into the prevailing chaos against the 
moral and political imperatives to enforce order and accountability. 
It is this schizophrenia that informs contradictions and inconsistencies regarding 
the party state's position and action on illicit economic activities. Contradictions have 
largely fallen under the rubric of authoritarian populism versus technocratic realism. The 
techno-realists/authoritarian populist dichotomy is represented by the concern for "land 
and factory capacity underutilization ... indiscipline and deliberate sabotage and 
disruption of productive land, (and economic activity)". This side of the binary extends to 
"call (for) law enforcement agencies to 'continue with their demonstrated resolve' to deal 
decisively with offenders who may want to reap where they did not sow'" (Gono, 2004, 
4). One can contrast this with the, "Which law are you talking about...?" retort from 
Mugabe when asked about the legality of price controls (Zimbabwe Independent, 13-19 
July, 2007, 8) or Mutasa's "land reform would not be complete if some farms remained 
in the hands of whites" (Gonye, 2007) a sentiment shared by Manyika and Goche among 
others who want Gono's 'prime ministerial powers' and 'wings clipped'. 
Not least riddled with contradictions has been Zimbabwe government's chaotic 
land reform program argued in this study to have given momentum to subsequent 
unregulated and disordered styles of accumulation. These contradictions as Michael 
Hartnack observed in July 2002 exist on every policy and action "from salvaging the 
crumbling economy, to food shortages and the seizure of white-owned farms". He notes 
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"political schizophrenia" permeating "Mugabe's cabinet, politburo and the ZANU-PF 
central committee". 
Commercial Farmers' Union president Colin Cloete this week pleaded with Mugabe to end 
confusion, particularly over public pledges flagrantly disregarded in practice that each farmer 
would be left with at least one property to sustain production. ... In one breath officials tell white 
farmers to grow all the wheat they can, regardless of the looming August 9 eviction deadlines, in 
the next to get off their 5 000 "former" properties immediately to make way for 354 000 black 
Zimbabweans. Finance Minister Simba Makoni talks of rebuilding relationships with international 
financial institutions, while Mugabe and other hardliners say the country has washed its hands of 
them forever. ... 
Hartnack further connects these contradictions with Makoni's "technocrat colleague", 
former banker and finance minister Nkosana Moyo's, decision to quit the Cabinet and 
flee with his family. He concludes; 
... all this reflects growing conflict between the "hawks" who have Mugabe's ear and the 
pragmatists looking, unblinkered, at the prospect of 7.8 million Zimbabweans (on their own 
figures) starving to death. Information Minister Jonathan Moyo, Agriculture Minister Joseph 
Made and Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa are leaders of the "hawks" while Makoni, known to 
have the sympathy of the South African government, is seen as the principal pragmatist. 
These contradictions have also been reflected in the lower levels of the party state. There 
were differences in land reform policy application in provinces, with widest in areas such 
as Chinhoyi - "where hard-line governor Peter Chanetsa holds sway - and in Gweru -
where the notably amenable Midlands Provincial Governor Cephas Msipha has power -
for the moment - to ameliorate decrees" (Zimbabwe News, July 20, 2002). 
The confusion on land reform continues to express itself as Didymus Mutasa 
alongside the military clash with Vice President Joseph Msika over farm invasions by the 
military in 2007. Msika wants the invasions to stop and is keen on having farmers 
produce, but the military have disregarded him. It is also probable that even without 
Mutasa's backing, the army chiefs would still go ahead with invasions. In the wake of a 
failed coup52 the army generals may be holding the party at ransom. Thus the state on one 
hand is an 'accomplice' to the new wave of farm occupations by the military, yet it is, on 
Several army chiefs and low ranking officers were taken for questioning on allegations of plan a coup to 
oust Mugabe. Six were taken to court and the issue has been dragging on up to now. 
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the other hand enthusiastic to seize any opportunity to debunk the 'mysticism of land 
reform as racially driven' by showing off remaining white farmers like Taylor-Freeme as 
among the beneficiaries of the government's agriculture mechanization program 
(Zimbabwe Independent, July 13-19, 2007, 11). Unfortunately those in the military, 
formerly left off; now want to benefit from the disorderly form of accumulation before it 
is too late. 
The contradictions, inconsistence and crisis mix has provided a fertile ground for 
corruption. Where parliament has formulated the Zimbabwe Chapter of the African 
Parliamentary Network against Corruption (APNAC) such initiatives have not been 
carried out to the letter. As noted in the introduction to this thesis Gono has said the 
uncouth acts need to be arrested. The Anti Corruption Commission's mission statement 
pledges to fight "abuse of power" (Anti Corruption Commission of Zimbabwe charter) 
hence acknowledging that there are people in power taking advantage of their positions. 
Yet the commission is poorly resourced and there is little evidence of serious 
commitment. It is doubtful if the commission is meant to have teeth. Indeed as Gono 
notes, "it is as if Central Government is undecided on whether or not to allow these (anti-
graft) arms of government to discharge their mandate" (July 2006, 16). 
Government actions on accountability, regulation and fairness have been 
inconsistent and selective. For instance, in a letter dated 30 April 2007 the Masvingo 
governor was asked by Didymus Mutasa (Minister of State Security and a close 
confidante of Mugabe) to surrender two of the three farms he acquired under fast track 
land reform on the basis of the government's one man one farm principle (Marwezu, 
2007). This is in spite of the fact that several ministers in Mugabe's cabinate have more 
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than one farm (Usenet.com archive, 9 May 2007; Dongo, 2001). Businessmen James 
Makamba and Mutumwa Mawere, former Finance Minister Kuruneri, economist and 
ZANU-PF apologist the late William Nhara have all been at one time incarcerated on 
different charges of economic nature. This has been selective as some in government 
were spared. For instance, Nherera was arrested with the omission of Chombo who was 
working with him in stealing from Zimbabwe United Passenger Company (ZUPCO). 
This selective application of justice exists in its extreme on the street, were vendors and 
forex dealers working for big chiefs are arrested and assaulted by police. The police seem 
unbothered with the prominent ZANU-PF leaders for whom the vendors and dealers 
work for. 
The concerns over ".. .inadequate measures to deal with rising levels of corruption 
in both the public and private sectors", "inconsistent policy pronouncements", ... "lack of 
commitment to effectively deal with the challenges facing the economy"; and "increasing 
indiscipline" "price distortions", (Mumbengegwi, 2007, 6) are well founded. In his 2007 
budget speech Mumbengegwi criticizes; 
...ill-timed and often contradictory policy pronouncements and decisions which, not only impact 
negatively on confidence, but also increase uncertainty among economic agents. A notable 
example would be resorting to the re-introduction of unsustainable price controls which, however, 
can only worsen the supply situation (2007 , 53) . 
It was hardly a month after this pronouncement that the price blitz was initiated. Alleged 
to be a brainchild of the Joint Operations Command (Muleya, 2007, 1), it was described 
by one journalist as being "the same template of harassment, bullying and threats [to 
retailers] the state unleashed against commercial farmers in 2000 under the guise of land 
reform" (Standard, 8 July 2007, 10). Previous price controls, at various times between 
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2003 and 2006 have been unpopular due to the serious shortages in basic commodities 
that they caused53. 
One needs not go far to prove how well founded Mumbengegwi's worries of 
inconsistency are. In one breath, Mugabe pledges to use his security forces to protect 
foreign investors (Sapa-dpa-AFP, Business Day 15 August, 2007). As an 'aside' and 
without diverting too far from this discussion one might ask, 'protection from whom by 
the military'? Probably unwittingly, Mugabe accepts that violence and disorder has 
become a Zimbabwean order of accumulation hence the need for the army to come in if 
foreign investors are to operate without hindrance. Important to note for now is that in 
this instance Mugabe's promise resonates with Mumbengegwi's pledges to restore 
business confidence. Ironically this came at a time, when his government was working on 
an indigenization law that threatened foreign investment in the mining sector54. 
The statements below, whether by shear coincidence or otherwise, show more 
clearly how contradictions within the ruling party have taken a techno-realist versus 
authoritarian populist dichotomy. In 2002 Secretary for Industry and International Trade, 
Stuart Comberbach and Simba Makoni, then Finance and Economic Development 
minister, were accused of sympathizing with bakers in a bread price row. The state 
owned daily newspaper The Herald (25 February 2002) quotes a government 
spokesperson calling on Comberbach to resign "because his attitude showed that his 
position was to represent industrialists rather than populist views". Notably the 
One reporter wondered about the specificity of the 18' of June date of 'effect' of the price freeze when 
the state run newspaper Herald had just increased its price from Z$15 000 to Z$25 000 on the 14th of July 
only four days before the date of the edict's date of effect {Zimbabwe Independent, July 13-19, 2007). 
54 The new mining indeginisation bill is similar to land grabs in that it forces all foreign mining firms to 
cede 25% of their shares to the state or 'indigenous Zimbabweans' for free. The bill limits foreign 
ownership of mining companies to less than 50%. 
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government spokesperson uses the word 'populist', referring to government view and 
policy. The same article goes on to quote Philip Chiyangwa (then ZANU-PF MP for 
Chinhoyi) in addition to attacking Comberbach saying 
we do not get instructions from secretaries but we are members of a legislature. How can a 
secretary ask us about a particular business when we have visited several of them? This shows that 
they are conniving to fix the Government by representing views of the few rather than populist 
views The Herald (25 February 2002). 
Again Chiyangwa uses the word 'populist' in this statement in more or less similar sense 
as above. 
Chiyangwa's cohort Kasukuwere's statement on the issue betrays the acquisitive 
agenda behind this vitriol. "If Lobels close we will buy it and ensure that indigenous 
blacks with expertise run the company for the benefit of the people". Kasukuwere, a 
business mogul, was promising to 'buy it' for himself and employ blacks. On his part 
Comberbach accused the two of abusing business. These two MPs went on to propose 
that price controls be extended to other products such as timber, steel and building 
materials. Chiyangwa has business interests in these products since he runs a property 
development company. 
The technocrat-realist strand that is largely pro-'neo-liberal' common sense is 
easy to distill regarding both fiscal and monetary policies. In monetary policies the need 
to boost both local and foreign investment is not minced. More clearly, in a secret dossier 
of advice to the government, Gono warns against price controls, urges privatization of 
parastatals and cautions against continued land invasions and infringement of property 
right (Zvomuya and Gedye, 2007, 2). The monetary policies call for safeguarding land 
tenure and honouring Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements (BIPAs) to safe guard 
these investors and "remedying those BIPAs which were inadvertedly infringed upon 
during the emotive stage of the land reform" (Gono, 2005, 23 and July 2006, 9). As has 
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become the style of Gono's policy pronouncements, always alluding to Mugabe's support 
for his policies, he went on to note that "our leadership share the same vision, as reflected 
by His Excellency, The President during His address to the nation on the occasion of the 
opening of the Sixth Parliament ..." (Gono, 2005, 23). Gono goes on to talk of remedial 
measures being implemented to restore good relations with the International Monetary 
Fund. In 2003 Gono quoted Mugabe as speaking against "the futility of trying to build 
our economy in an environment poisoned by pointless conflict and finger pointing" to 
show that his policy of international engagement is congruent with the President's. To 
this end Gono even set up a foreign direct investment unit to help promote and facilitate 
foreign direct investment (2003, 23). These however have not been successful because 
very few foreign investors have been forthcoming due to the prevailing political 
environment. 
Where his policies are likely to clash with those of his populist peers in the ruling 
party, Gono appears to have learnt the art of his survival. His allusion to the President 
agreeing with him has more to do with flattering Mugabe's egomania than any material 
convergence of ideas. When it comes to sensitive issues where he may not easily find 
agreement with Mugabe, he resorts to this appeasement. One media report has pointed 
out that Mugabe is said to have told Gono "I am not stupid", in response to the latter's 
"devaluation [of the foreign exchange rate] by other means". Gono, knowing that his 
superior is not always in agreement with his techno-realist stance, has struggled to 
withstand, or circumvigate the ZANU-PF's authoritarian populist path. In this particular 
instance (when Mugabe is said to have told Gono "I am not stupid"), Gono had opted for 
a 'smart devaluation' in the name of the Drought Mitigation and Economic Stabilisation 
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Fund, ostensibly to raise foreign currency to import food for drought relief (Gono, April 
2007, 18). Under this fund a seller of foreign currency to RBZ would be paid 60 times 
more than the official rate value. This, like his "carrot and stick Export Retention 
Scheme" (Gono, 2003; 2004, 18-19; 2005; 2006; 2007), which rewards exporters who 
'faithfully' repatriate export proceeds with a higher and more favorable exchange rate, or 
the "favorably higher" diaspora rate (July 2004, 23) is a polite way to devalue, knowing 
his superior is against devaluation. 
The RBZ itself has not been without its own contradictions. On one hand Gono 
makes an avowed pledge to amputate '"deals" and speculative mentality' and inflict 
heavy loses on those "who had developed near cults in subversive dealings" hence "drill 
the death nail on the head of the foreign exchange parallel market'" (July 2006, 22). On 
the other hand, the RBZ is involved actively in promoting parallel market foreign 
currency dealings by deploying as many as 40 buyers in the streets of Bulawayo and 80 
in Harare to buy foreign currency from the parallel market. In fact as it emerged it is 
RBZ's official secret policy to buy cash from the parallel market as seen by the firing of 
its CIO member responsible for buying of forex on parallel market for failing to remit to 
the Bank all the money he was getting from the parallel market. In June 2007 there was a 
near shortage of forex on the black market with the rand and US dollar gaining against 
the Zimbabwe currency. There was speculation that ZESA had bought large amounts of 
forex on the parallel market in order to settle its debt with external suppliers 
It is in this context - of the instrumentalisation of the state (Chabal and Daloz, 
1999) - in which the increased deregulation, disorder and contradictions in the 
pronouncement and execution of state policy that the state has had to confront the 
increasing illicit trade in minerals such as gold and, most recently, diamonds. In the case 
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of diamonds in Marange, Lloyd Sachikonye notes the Minerals Marketing Corporation of 
Zimbabwe's (MMCZ) as a handicap in curbing illicit diamond mining and trade. Where 
it has attempted to stamp its authority, those efforts have been undermined by politicians 
with vested interests. Sachikonye quotes the Mail and Guardian as noting that; "At least 
three Ministers in Manicaland mobilised villagers to pan for diamonds after prospecting 
rights to the area expired. The diamonds were subsequently sold on the black market, 
bypassing the MMCZ" (2007, 5). 
Gold constitutes more than 50% of Zimbabwe's total minerals exports (Gono, 
2004, 15). In Gono's maiden monetary statement, the RBZ chief promised to raise gold 
deliveries by 30 tones annually. This saw a rise of 22 tones the following year but the 
deliveries have decreased in the subsequent years (Gono, July 2006, 27). During the first 
quarter of 2007 gold deliveries were 2, 76 tones marking a decline of 19% from 2006 
over the same period (Gono, April 2007, 15). "Instead [Gono notes], the underworld 
markets of smuggled gold are reportedly flourishing, right under the country's collective 
noses ... let us declare war against smugglers irrespective of who they are" (July 2006, 
27). Who they are refers to the likes of Mnangagwa who works with the country's most 
notorious gold dealer, Mac Milan, the Vice-President's husband Solomon Mujuru, army 
brigadiers, Ministers, Senior police chiefs, members of the CIOs among other high 
ranking and low ranking state functionaries. 
This chapter has entangled the context and factors leading to the highly 
unregulated production within which we can locate the increased illegal extraction of 
gold. It gives sense to what follows as it amounts to answering the question, how did we 
get here in the first place? The next chapter makes a closer inspection of how this 
accumulation process is unfolding in illegal gold mining. Broader themes and hypotheses 
for this study are impressed on and reinforced notwithstanding few overlaps. It 
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underscores the increased (ever increasing) informalisation of production, increased 
centrality of the party state and its contradictions and the outcomes thereof. The level, 
form and frequency of accumulation wars (violent clashes) at mining sites is alarming to 
say the least. Never to be fully measured by this study are also the social and 
environmental impacts of uncontrolled gold extraction. 
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Chapter 4 
Disorder, Violence and Accumulation: 
The Case of Totororo Gold Smuggling 
Introduction 
The previous chapter has surveyed the unregulated nature of accumulation dominating 
Zimbabwe's political economy. This chapter narrows to give a micro view of the same. It 
looks at the role of state and non state actors, contradictions in state policy and practices, 
emerging accumulation networks, conflicts, processes and outcomes. A close study of 
gold panning in Totororo area, rural Kwekwe, is examined. In so doing, the chapter will 
highlight the empirical reality of accumulation and the illegal gold trade as it relates to 
the crisis and party-state. Conclusive analysis is carried out in the next and final chapter. 
Illegal gold mining and trade have virtually eclipsed formal mining and 
agriculture as the main economic activity in Kwekwe and its surrounding rural spaces. 
The prevalence of panning is reflected in local language with prostitutes55 for instance 
being referred to as 'sex panners' {The Midlands Observer, 24 October 2003, 4). The 
emerging picture mirrors and epitomizes the unregulated and disorderly accumulation 
pattern unfolding in post-2000 Zimbabwe. So extensive and unordered has been gold 
panning in Kwekwe that trenches have been dug on national roads, railway lines, public 
and private premises. Indeed, the city of Kwekwe has earned the title 'Makorokoza 
(illegal gold miners) capital'. In October 2001 the Midlands Observer estimated the 
number of people involved in gold panning activities in Kwekwe and surrounding areas 
Whereas prostitution is one of the social vices that has flourished due to economic hardships in general 
across the country, the predominantly male dominated gold panning activities have made Kwekwe a 
thriving market for prostitution in comparison to other centers. 
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to be +/-600 000 (24 October, 2001) . The paper further quoted Blessing Chebundo, 
Member of Parliament for Kwekwe Urban (MDC), as expressing concern over the 
exploitation of gold panners by ruling party politicians. 
The Totororo area lies approximately 60 km north east of Kwekwe, close to the 
ghost township of the former Empress Mine. Empress mine was owned by the Canadian 
Company, Falcon Gold Zimbabwe Limited. Though extracting mainly nickel, Falcon's 
Empress Mine also obtained chrome, copper and gold. Falcon Gold had several mines in 
Zimbabwe, namely Venice Mine lying between Kadoma and Empress Mine, Dalny in 
Chegutu, Golden Quarry Mine in Shurugwi and Old Nic Mine in Bulawayo. Empress 
Mine closed in 1989 while Venice and Dalny mine were closed in 1998 (see map on page 
iv). The closures are said to have resulted from viability problems (former mine worker, 
July 2007). 
The outcome of these closures has been increased illegal gold mining activities 
and informal settlements in the former mines. Most of the mine workers continued to stay 
at the mine's township, eking out a living from farming and informal merchandising. 
Also, after Empress Mine's demise the government started allocating land for small scale 
mining as part of the indigenization initiative. This program had started slowly in the 
1980s but got a renewed impetus in the 90s with the swelling of the indigenization 
movement (Phimister and Raftopoulos, 2004, 360-361, former mine worker July 2007). 
However, because mining proved costly and less rewarding than gold buying most of 
these small scale miners ended up acting as middleman, buying gold for resale to RBZ 
This 600 000 figure might be an exaggeration and should be treated with caution considering that 
KweKwe Metro in 2005 had a population of 60 000 according to Central Statistics Office. However it 
points to the level of increase in panning activities. 
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from local subsistence farmers who would engage in alluvial gold panning during the off-
agricultural season (Cheater, 1984; fieldwork interview, 2 July 2007). 
As the economic crisis worsened towards the end of the 1990s it became 
relatively easy and profitable for the small scale miners to buy from illegal miners 
encamped at Falcon Gold's closed Empress and Venice Mines57. These illegal miners 
were mostly former mine workers at these mines. It is worth noting that the scattered 
nature of gold deposits in the area makes it unprofitable for capital intensive medium to 
large scale commercial mining ventures. Such a precondition thus advantages illegal 
mining over settled, long term mining. A relationship of interdependence thus ensued 
between the small scale miners and illegal panners, as the latter also relied on the former 
for mills to crush the gold-bearing stones. 
While the increase in panning activities around Totororo was noticeable towards 
the late 1990s, the post-2000 period is without precedent. A number of factors stirred a 
wave of heightened illegal mining and trade of gold. Increased economic decline and a 
high rate of unemployment meant that gold panning provided a survival alternative for 
both subsistence farmers and the unemployed. Secondly the poor climatic and 
geological58 conditions of the Totororo area predisposed local rural subsistence farmers 
to other survival strategies. Seasonal crop cultivation alone can never be a reliable and 
adequate sole means of subsistence. The drought years, such as in 1992, hit Totororo so 
hard that gold panning activity increased. 
That these former mine workers remained encamped at the closed mines does not necessarily mean that 
they carried out illegal mining activities at them. Their activities started from the mine's vicinity to 
surrounding areas, using the former mines as bases for shelter and convenient settlement. The former 
mine's pits and tunnels have since been exhausted. 
58 The area is too rocky for crop cultivation and rainfall patterns are poor. 
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Thirdly and conjuncturally decisive were the unregulated forms of accumulation 
that came with the chaotic land reform and the ruling party's emergent authoritarian 
populist power retention strategies. This authoritarian populism saw ZANU-PF allowing 
illegal miners to take over the disused Globe and Phoenix Mine, about 20 kilometers 
from Totororo, as part of the 2002 presidential election campaign. Though state policies 
later changed and started to enforce order in these areas, the early intervention gave 
confidence to panners, and spurred similar activities in Totororo and surrounding areas. 
Farm workers made redundant by the fast track land reform and those made jobless due 
to the subsequent closure of industries joined former mine workers in gold panning. 
Approximately two out of every five panners59 involved at Totororo were formerly 
employed, either in town or at a farm. The other component among illegal miners is 
constituted by employable youths from both near and far, and former Venice mine 
workers. 
In 2003 an approximately five gram stone of gold was discovered in a maize field 
in Navhata (a rural village nearly 9km from Totororo). The news spread, triggering a 
scramble. The field was dug up and left disfigured, with trenches and pits all over. A 
reasonable quantity of gold was obtained, but was exhausted quickly. This triggered a 
gold 'rush' leading to extensive gold hunting by locals, mostly through the use of copper 
wire to detect the presence of gold60. In the same year a trench believed by Totororo 
villagers to have been formerly dug and later abandoned by Germans was discovered. 
The man who initially discovered the tunnel claimed, falsely, to have exclusive mining 
59 This is derived from the field work, which surveyed 57 illegal miners. 
60 Two copper wires are held parallel in the arms above the ground. One moves around holding them. Once 
they come to a place with gold deposits the wires will automatically come together as if through a magnetic 
pull. 
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rights to the tunnel. It was soon discovered that he did not have any entitlements, and 
another gold rush ensued. This tunnel was so lucrative that it attracted hundreds of people 
from all over Zimbabwe. At its peak in 2005, every province of Zimbabwe was 
represented at the site (Anonymous3, Interview, 2007). 
Tunnels of Death! 
The year 2005 marked the peak of gold panning in Totororo. Operation 'Restore Order', 
or Murambvatsina, which saw the destruction of illegal shacks and informal business 
structures in towns (Potts, 2006) added to the increase in panning activities. Hundreds 
within Totororo's closest urban center Kwekwe and Kadoma were left jobless and 
homeless (Midlands Observer, 3 June 2003, 1). These joined the ever swelling numbers 
of squatters at former Falcon mines of Venice and Empress who were surviving on illegal 
gold panning. The tunnel soon extended to about 100 m in length. It started as a single 
tunnel but because there were too many people, the survival of the fittest rule set in. The 
strongest, known as Mbimbo (strongman, mafia leader/warlord) started to use their power 
to muscle others out. The weak had to either work for the Mbimbo as pamuza/pamupamu 
(forced labourer) or had to seek approval from them to assess the tunnel. 
Alternatively those too weak to physically contest the main and more lucrative 
tunnel (referred to as Kunyanga) started to open a different shaft (later referred to as 
Kwamainini) along the same gold belt (see diagrams below). The two tunnels later 
merged as panners continued digging, creating a 'mine' ceiling of more than 8000 square 
meters of land mass suspended underground. Except for the first few meters at the mouth 
of the tunnel the distance between the floor of the tunnel and the roof is between 50cm 
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and 1 meter. This means that miners working inside the tunnel have to crawl for most of 
the time. It has literally become a death trap. Below are diagrammatic representations of 
the tunnel. 
Kwamainini (Eastern Wing/Tunnel) 
Water Table 
Kunyanga (Western Wing Tunnel) 
1 0 0 m 
Fig 5; Vantage (Arial) View presentation of the Totororo underground shafts 
S u r f a c e 
l O O m 
E - n t r a n c e 
•W" a t e r T a b 1 < 
Fig 6: Vertical (Side) Diagrammatic illustration of the Tunnel 
Fig 7, 8 and 9 Tunnel Entrance 
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During the gold rush's peak as many as 60 panners would be underground at a 
given time (anonymous 2, 'interview, 3 July 2007). This further widened the 
underground mine roof area. Given that there are no support pillars to support the 
suspended mass of earth this is very risky. Hundreds of people were involved in this rush, 
mostly in panning gold bands known as Makorokozas. They consisted mainly of locals, 
but ranged from as far away as Venice, Gokwe, Kwekwe, Mberengwa and several other 
parts of the country as news of the gold finds spread. With a density of 90%-98%, the 
quality of the gold in this area and rural Kwekwe in general is said to be the country's 
best (anonymous 5, interview, 10 July 2007). As occurrence of higher quality gold 
increased the tunnel was further widened, extended and deepened until it reached the 
water table. So determined are the panners that they even dive into the water forming at 
the end of the tunnel to set dynamites to crack the gold-bearing rock. 
Claiming he had a license to mine the tunnel, a man identified as Camfort (whose 
wife is ZANU-PF Secretary for administration Emmerson Mnangagwa' s sister-in-law) 
hired a compressor which was used to draw water out of the tunnel. Comfort later 
withdrew his compressor because people were not paying for fuel and other charges to 
use it. Moreover he feared that the tunnel would collapse anytime (Anonymous 3, 
Interview, 9 July 2007). After withdrawing the compressor in February 2007, he started 
developing his own tunnel just beside the main tunnel. Those who did not have a 
compressor continued digging the old tunnel despite the pool of water that had formed. 
Tragically on the 7th of July 2007, at the time of this research, a 20 year old gold panner 
drowned in this pool. His death was never registered. 
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The young man, a son of the ZANU-PF youth coordinator in the area was only 
discovered dead the following day. News of his drowning came from a distant village, 
which suggests that a fellow miner who had accompanied the young man had fled after 
the tragedy. It is likely that he broke the news while managing to hide his identity. The 
parents had of course started to worry after the boy did not return home. The father 
together with other members of the community then went to the tunnel. Three panners 
went into the tunnel where they found the dead body. In such circumstances the 
procedure according to Zimbabwean law is to call the paramedical police, or police sub 
aqua unit to extract the drowned body and write a scene report. This was not followed. 
Despite the insistence by one Kraal Head and some sections of the community who 
included a school Headmaster and some teachers that law be followed, the body was 
retrieved by fellow miners and carried home for burial. The father - who also serves in 
the police reserve force - insisted that the matter be covered up and so it was. 
The death was never reported or registered. The two local police officers present 
were also keen on having the matter put to rest unceremoniously. This was because they 
feared any investigation would find them culpable because they had failed to execute an 
earlier order from their superiors to close the shaft. The police had justification for this 
hastily and unprocedural decision. They argued that there was only one police officer at 
the Empress station. Lack of fuel also made it unlikely that specialized police units would 
come in time, if at all. Nor was there a telephone to phone them to come. All this is not 
without truth. More importantly it points to the lack of order characterising post-2000 
accumulation patterns. A similar tragedy had occurred a month earlier at another illegal 
mine in Bhamala. Police officers manning the mine fled after the incident because they 
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were not officially supposed to be there. They were manning the area unofficially and 
outside their normal duty in order to control access to the tunnel, taking bribes in the 
process. 
Structures and Networks in illegal Gold Mining 
The form, structure and organisation of illegal gold panning activities are opaque. On 
face value one may easily dismiss gold panning in Zimbabwe as merely an activity for 
rural dwellers battling to cope with poverty. On the contrary, to analyse this phenomenon 
means going further than the fact that for some, the benefits of gold panning go beyond 
rural survival. To limit it thus would conceal the role of Zimbabwe's party state and those 
connected to it. Moreover, going beyond such a perspective would, though outside the 
present scope of this thesis, enable us to start to envisage the role played by international 
trade links in fueling illicit activities. Within our present limits, it is safe to conclude that 
as in the land reform exercise and other policies, those connected to the party state have 
benefited. Nonetheless, it may be prudent to suggest in passing that since most of the 
gold does not enter Zimbabwe's formal market, but is smuggled out of the country, 
external connections in this illicit gold trade might be the ultimate beneficiaries. Without 
a 'Kimberly Process'61, it is easy to smuggle 'blood gold' out of the Zimbabwe border 
and for it to enter the international formal trade system. 
Yet the opacity of illegal gold mining can be dissected by examining its 
organization. There are 'syndicates' consisting of a group of miners working together62. 
61 That is, an internationally instituted mechanism to curb illicit diamond trade by making sure every 
diamond in the market can be traced back to its source. Although this process is imperfect and diamonds 
continue to be smuggled, it has been argued that it has gone a long way in reducing and making difficult 
illicit diamond trade. 
62 A cursory examination of the illegal gold mining language uses reveals a lot about the social relations 
evolving out of illegal gold mining. For example terms like 'front' suggest someone is secretly behind the 
illegal mining deals, whereas terms like Mbimbo (a feared strong man leading a mafia) suggest conflicts of 
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These groups are distinguishable from individual miners who may have made illegal 
mining a permanent vocation or those who engage in the practice infrequently. In most 
cases, those making illegal gold mining and trade a permanent vocation operate in groups 
unless they are gold buyers. Permanent panners operating individually are mostly local 
youths. People from other areas travel and operate in bands. These are nomadic panners 
which, as shall be proposed in the next chapter, suggest a labour force of a new type. 
These move from one area to another when gold is exhausted or once they hear of a place 
that has high gold deposits. At the time of this study in mid-2007 these bands had 
migrated from Totororo to a new place called Bhamala, about 9km away, because more 
lucrative gold finds had just been discovered. 
Syndicates vary from organized and permanent ones to impromptu alliances of 
convenience. Impromptu syndicates normally arise where local gangs need to withstand 
or muscle out 'intruders'. These are also common among the nomadic panners as a way 
to deal with police and competition over access to panning sites by rival groups. There 
are estimated to be more than eighty organized permanent syndicates in Kwekwe alone. 
These are characterised by claims of legality, suggesting an elitist formation. They are 
often relatively stationary and involve a big chief connected to the state working in 
alliance with a regional business partner and/or local individuals. These syndicates are 
often known to have distinctive leaders, who either operate openly or as front men for a 
government or party official. 
In the case of the above tunnels in Totororo, there were two organized syndicates 
competing for access to the gold belt. These are the 'Mazenge' or 'Mnangagwa' and 
access and warlordism, while Zvipamuzi (slave) suggest exploitation. There is much more suggestive 
jargon. 
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'Matongo' or 'Razor wire'. Emmerson Mnangagwa is the ZANU-PF Secretary for 
Administration. He is responsible for managing the ZANU-PF companies, a position 
which gives him enormous power in the ZANU-PF accumulation matrix. It is this 
position that has given him good links in the 'capital world' (Africa.com, 2008) 
especially with ZANU-PF's white capitalist friends. Matongo is one among several 
Totororo area Headmen. The tunnel is situated in his kraal. Mazenge is the local villager 
who occupies the homestead within which part of the gold tunnel lies. He has been 
'incorporated' into the Mnangagwa syndicate as a strategy to give legitimacy to the 
Mnangagwa claim against the Matongo claim. Comfort, the Mnangagwa syndicate's 
'front man', is Mnangagwa's brother-in-law. Unlike most panners, this syndicate does 
not sell gold to local buyers. It has been suggested that its members take the gold to 
Mnangagwa, who ensures that the gold is smuggled to the more lucrative South African 
market through Zimbabwe's most famous gold dealer Mac Milan and other connections 
(Anonymous 1, 2007). This claim has been difficult to validate. 
The other syndicate is known unofficially as the 'Razor Wire' because of the 
Razor Wire fence that was erected, ostensibly by RBZ's gold buying arm, Fidelity 
Printers. It is clear that there is intense competition between the two syndicates. 
Circumstances surrounding the erection of the fence point to the manipulation of RBZ by 
individuals connected to the bank and the regional mining commissioner. For over a year 
since the erection of the fence no official buying has been conducted by Fidelity. In fact, 
despite the fence being put up in June 2006 Fidelity has not been present and there is no 
indication that it will establish itself anytime soon. The area is guarded by Fawcet 
Security Company, which is linked to the Gweru businessman working with Matongo. 
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The fenced area is in fact the Headman's homestead lying just about 50 meters opposite 
to Mazenge's homestead, on which Mnangagwa's syndicate is camped. The Matongo 
syndicate is digging a parallel tunnel to the Mnangagwa syndicate and structures to crush 
gold have been erected. The erection of the fence is not uncommon for Fidelity. It has 
been RBZ policy to establish such gold buying stations at gold mills and places were gold 
is mined informally so that panners will be forced to bring the gold to Fidelity once they 
have panned. 
Fig 10 - Left - Headman 
Matongo's Homestead fenced 
and guarded 24 hours everyday 
by Fawcett Security. According 
to the Headman, the structures 
have been built to provide an 
office, toilets and change rooms 
and sheds for workers crushing 
the stones. He produced a mining 
certificate and license from die 
mining commission. He claims 
that the Mnangagwa syndicate is 
illegal and encroaching into their 
mine. 
Fig 11: On the left - Mnangagwa's syndicate tunnel entrance. On the right - Matongo's 
syndicate tunnel entrance 
While local people think that RBZ is establishing a gold buying centre, according 
to the Headman this is not the case (Matongo, Interview, 5 July 2007). In the first place 
the fenced area is the Headman's homestead. According to the Headman, he is in a 
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mining syndicate (partnership) with James, a gold dealer based in Kwekwe. He claims 
that initially RBZ wanted to establish a gold buying centre, but that changed. As proof he 
has a prospecting license and claim registration certificate obtained from the mining 
commissioner63. The involvement of a Kanyati RBZ security official, and one Patrick 
Madzorere, linked to the security company Fawcet, which is known to have links with the 
ruling party, further raises eyebrows. What shows upon serious scrutiny is that the two 
competing syndicates are in fact involving members of the ruling elite. The Matongo 
syndicate has the support of RBZ senior officials, a Gweru businessman who is a ruling 
party member, and a former Midlands provincial mining commissioner once based in 
Gweru who probably fast tracked the legal paper work to legitimize the claim in order to 
counter the Mnangagwa group. The Mnangagwa syndicate is undoubtedly backed by 
Mnangagwa. A similar scene in this prevailing chaotic mode of accumulation has been 
noted in the previous chapter, where members of the ruling elite clashed on a farm. More 
recently the media has reported on clashes in Mashonaland West were ruling party 
provincial leadership has clashed with National Security and Land Affairs minister, 
Didymus Mutasa. 
From this case, it is possible to draw networks of accumulation flows as shown 
below. A simple commodity chain analysis (Gereffi et al, 2001) would reveal the 
following: 
In what could be a case of accumulation rivalry in ZANU-PF, the mining commissioner was once 
arrested for corruption on the awarding of mining claims certificate. He was released and later transferred 
to Masvingo 
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International Buyer - Mainly 
South Africa and UK 
Fig 12 - The Blue arrows represent the expected 'official' flow of gold when it is fed into the formal state 
system, while the black show the most common, but unofficial flow. 
However the above gold flow representation is simplistic and prima facie. The illicit 
trade network is more complex than a simple flow diagram would allow us to 
contemplate. It is more revealing to talk of accumulation networks as shown below. 
ACCUMULATION NETWORKS DIAGRAM 
EXTERNAL TRADE NETWORKS 
CRISIS 
STATE - RBZ/GVT 
Official/Member of 




miners/Gold buyers n 
LOCAL LINK, Kraal Head, Homestead owner, 




Away from the simplistic flow represented supra, the network is complex. Players 
at a given stage may not be what they seem to be. They may be mere representatives. For 
example the so called local buyers are more often than not front men acting on behalf of 
big chiefs in government, party or business. As a result the stages of production may or 
may not flow as depicted in a straight line. Whilst elites employ buyers, they can also buy 
either directly or through conduits in regional centers. Furthermore, they can be involved 
in illegal gold mining on the ground, as noted in the case of the Mnangagwa and 
Matongo syndicates above. The same Mnangagwa, for instance, is said to be closely 
connected to 'Mac Burden and Mac Milan', reported to be some sort of national buyers 
responsible for exporting virtually 'all illegal' gold out of Zimbabwe (Anonymous 1, 
Interview, 17 June 2007). Also, independent buyers often export directly to neighboring 
countries especially South Africa, making the accumulation network even more complex. 
It may also be noted that these networks are being constructed within the context 
of a party-state and an environment of crisis characterised by a thriving black market and 
selective enforcement of law and order. In all accumulation interactions the party-state 
has become ever more salient; either in its enforcement of regulation or as elites 
manipulate positions of influence in their own or their clients' favour. The salience of the 
party-state is attributed to the fact that unlike in other degenerate states where a political 
economy of conflict obtains, in spite of the crisis, Zimbabwe has retained a coherent and 
functionally cohesive state superstructure. This superstructure can be used by those 
connected to the state to selectively apply laws or refrain from doing so to their and their 
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clients' advantage. It has thus become a rule that, for one to successfully engage in illegal 
gold trade or any other informal economic activity reliance has to be on the state's 
monopoly on coercion characterised by selective enforcement of the laws. 
Violence and Warlordism 
Spontaneous and organized violence is a common feature as rival panning groups contest 
for access to mining sites or resist police raids. The lines of contest manifest a local -
'foreign' (from other regions or villages) dichotomy, registered syndicates against 
unregistered or even between registered syndicates (which we have said are normally 
controlled by elites) themselves. These violent clashes can involve as many as 400 
panners and often result in serious injuries and deaths (The Midlands Observer, 3 October 
2003, 1). On the last week of November 2003 Amaveni residential area in Kwekwe was 
turned into a 'war zone' as local panners fought with the 'Vampire group' of gold 
panners from Zhombe (near Totororo) (The Midlands Observer 7 November 2003). They 
were fighting over mining rights granted by council. The Vampire group, which is said to 
derive its name from its mode of operation, has allegedly 'caused havoc and instilled fear 
in the registered syndicates'. Notably, the Vampire group is alleged to have links with 
"powerful individuals within the police force" and thus "does its activities without fear of 
reprisals from law enforcers" (The Midlands Observer, 2003). This explains the locals' 
resort to taking law into their own hands. 
Conflicts and subsequent violence have not always manifested at the gold mining 
sites, but through other social platforms. In Totororo most violent clashes at local shops 
have been traced to 'the tunnel'. It has not been uncommon for panners to be beaten to 
- 9 5 -
death by communities for alleged involvement in criminal activities (The Times, February 
28-March 6, 2003). In a letter, a Midlands Observer reader expressed concern over 
Chipinda, a mafia leader in Kwekwe. He alleged that Chipinda had been terrorizing 
residents of Kwekwe. Before his arrest and three year conviction for murdering his girl 
friend "Chipinda had become so powerful ... and so untouchable that the Zimbabwe 
Republic Police (ZRP) would even 'salute' him". The fighting groups normally act under 
the guidance of a leader (Mbimbo). Some of the leaders have even gone to the extent of 
hiring private security companies or even the ZRP, to wipe out rival panners. 
The above scenario, where police are sometimes hired by individual illegal miners 
against rivals, has left the force bereft of respect from the miners. As a result police have 
suffered at the hands of determined gold panners, even where impartial action is taken. 
Over the last five years the police have carried out not less than twenty raids at the 
Totororo tunnels. In a number of instances, especially in 2005, panners have mobilized 
and violently resisted police raids. In one incident a police officer held a meeting with 
panners only to afterwards find his bicycle tires deflated (Anonymous 3, Interview, 9 July 
2007). Violence against the police is by no means unique to Totororo. Recently an online 
Zimbabwe news publication reported the beating up of two policemen by illegal diamond 
miners in Chimanimani, eastern Zimbabwe, resulting in the death of one of the officers. 
Fig 14: Mthombeni (Axe used in violent clashes by Gold Panners). 
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The violent contestations have not been met without an attempt to order and 
create a harmonious coexistence between panners. It is at this instance that one sees the 
salience of the party-state again. Notwithstanding that violence in itself is an attempt 
towards ordering, attempt towards order have mainly been through the police, chiefs and 
Headman and ZANU-PF party structures. This attempt at order and regulation has not 
been without contradictions. In fact as shall be observed in the following section, it has 
saved to reinforce contradictions that have strategically benefited those connected to the 
party state. 
The Party State and Illegal Gold Mining 
The state's attitudes and actions on illegal mining activities have been haphazard and at 
best ambivalent. This mimics a national pattern, as with the case of diamonds in Marange 
(Sachikonye, 2007). At the initiation of the government with sponsorship from local 
businessmen meetings are held between the police, the Zimbabwe Small Scale Miners 
organisation, the Buyers Association (ZIMSSBA) and the Ministry of Mines and the 
local government authorities ostensibly to deal with illegal gold trade (The Midlands 
Observer, 3 June 2003 and 27 May 2005, 1). All these have come to naught. After one 
such meeting there was an instruction from police to close the Totororo illegal mining 
tunnel, but at the time of writing (31 December 2007) this had not happened. 
Police have sworn to be tougher with illegal miners. According to the Midlands 
Observer, by May 2007 ten people had died in police raids and 26 000 had been arrested 
since the launch of operation Chikorokoza Chapera (literally meaning 'illegal mining has 
ended') in 2006 (Zimonline, May 14, 2007). The 14th February 2003 edition of the 
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Midlands Observer (ppl) reported a police crackdown on illegal gold panners in an 
operation code named "operation Mariyawanda (too much money) nabbing as many as 
900 panners, destroying illegal settlements and burning over 300 shacks at Venice mine" 
. This operation was in fact carried out by members of the Military Police, Soldiers and 
the Prison Service jointly. Of note, the paper suggested that at least one of the raided 
areas was a support base for Zimbabwe's opposition MDC. Police were heavy handed, 
firing teargas into the tunnels. Despite these efforts gold panning thrives. 
At one point in 2005 a police raid led to the arrest of 33 at the Totororo site. 
These people included Chief Samuel Samambwa. The previous week 30 miners in 
Amaveni in Kwekwe had been arrested. Chief Samambwa and the 32 other accused were 
sentenced to three months imprisonment but the option of a fine saw none of these 
spending even a day in prison. The fine for illegal gold panning falls far short of acting as 
a deterrent, given the limited survival alternatives faced by most people. In one instance 
99 gold panners were arrested and sentenced to one month imprisonment or a Z$100 000 
fine. By end of the same day they had all paid the Z$100 000 fine (Midlands Observer, 1, 
March, 2005). This raises questions about the seriousness of law enactors in discouraging 
illegal mining and trade. Moreover, government efforts to end gold panning have been 
reactive rather than proactively setting up institutions to deal with minerals trafficking 
permanently. In the same way most police raids are reactions to violence between miners 
rather than crackdowns on illegal gold activities. 
In a typical case of instant taxation, far from cracking down on illegal gold 
mining the police are now cashing in on miners by managing access to mining sites. At 
the time of this research a tunnel in Bhamala, had become the new centre of gold rush 
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and was heavily guarded by the police. The police were charging $3 million (equivalent 
to a policeman's monthly salary) in July 2007 - approximately RSA R200 per hour spent 
in the tunnel. Panners, grateful to the police for managing access, thus creating order and 
averting violent conflict, pay and enter in groups of eight to ten each turn. Police 
presence at the tunnel increased drastically from the first day of manning the place. 
Starting as three, the police officers increased to six the second day and fourteen the third 
(Anonymouus 2, interview, 3 July 2007). So lucrative has been this arrangement that 
police officers started to compete. They operated in two day shifts in order to 
accommodate each other. 
Spending as much as twelve hours manning the pit translates to ZW$36 million. 
When shared among ten officers each can take home an untaxed ZW$3,6 million64 more 
than a police officer's monthly salary. Thus in this case, the police, while not selling or 
extracting gold, have become beneficiaries because of their position in the state. The 
policemen were also deserting official duty to guard yet another mining tunnel at St 
George65, about 12 kilometers from Totororo. These appear to have made an arrangement 
with their immediate superiors. While these superiors do not go out to man the mines, 
they get remittance from juniors who have to keep them pleased in order to be 
'redeployed' to the lucrative tunnel. More than once these police officers have run away 
when other more senior superiors arrive from Kwekwe (Anonymous 3, interview, 3 July 
2007). 
64 The high rate of inflation and exchange rate make this figure vague. With a July 2007 parallel rate of 
Z$15 000 to Rl the 36 million is reduced to R2400 and 3,6 million is reduced to R240. 
65 The tunnel at St George hospital was left after its owner committed suicide. Sakala, the deceased owner 
is said to have been directed to the once abandoned mine by a German national whose grandfathers 
operated the mine long ago. Sakala was making a fortune until he commited suicide after being tricked off 
1 kg of gold by some Nigerians. He had even managed to electrify Chief Samambwa's home (Anonymous 
3, interview, 3 July 2007). 
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This system goes further to net in some in the ruling party provincial leadership. 
One ex-combatant wrote to the Midlands Observer as follows, 
I am writing in connection with corruption happening at Gaika Mine. I am a war veteran. The 
recently posted Support Unit Police boss is making hefty amounts of money through the 
Amakorokozas. He is said to be charging about Z$3 000 000 per syndicate and getting a monthly 
lump sum of Z$50 000 000. This is a circle involving some ruling party members, it's so boring 
when I am making a living from the only Z$ 1 000 000 gratuity I am being paid ... (War Vet, 
Kwekwe, in The Midlands Observer, December 2 2005). 
One can not help noticing the emphasis, 'I am a war veteran', and the writer signs off as 
'War Vet'. On a close scrutiny the 'war vet' seems to be saying T must not be left out, 
being also a wars vet and member of ZANU-PF'. 'How can I continue to survive on a 
meager ZW$1 000 000 when others are making as much as $50 000 000?' Again the 
salience of the party state in accumulation is evinced in the language of the letter. 
Where the police have not acted to order access to mining sites, ZANU-PF party 
structures have been used to bring some order. In Totororo the ZANU-PF youth leader 
Machazo has been active in managing access to the tunnel in the name of organizing 
youths. He is also a member of the local police reserve. Machazo's imposed authority on 
the tunnel derives from his position in the party. For him and many others like him, 'our 
resource that is everyone's resource' excludes those not members of ZANU-PF. He was 
instrumental in covering up the death of his son in a tunnel to avoid specialized police 
investigation. Similarly ruling party projects in the name of the state' such as 'Women in 
Mining', have without shame, excluded those in the opposition. 
While the above scenario of instant taxation by the police is criminal, it is 
congruent with the obtaining state practice regarding illegal mining activities. The 
general direction of practice seems to be that of finding means to accommodate these 
illegal mining activities rather than arresting those who carry them out. At a meeting 
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involving the Ministry of Mines secretary, the city of Kwekwe Mayor, small scale gold 
miners, and buyers, the Ministry of Mines promised to overhaul the mining legislation to 
"empower the historically disadvantaged small scale miners" and to regulate illegal gold 
mining and trade, (The Midlands Observer 3 June 2003). "We are not saying that they 
should cease their activities forthwith, but that they should be wary of the dangers 
associated with disused mines and shafts especially now that the rain season has started", 
(Middlands Observer, 24 October 2003, 2) the police spokesperson for Kwekwe 
commented after a miner had drowned in a disused mining tunnel at Turtle mine in 
Silobela. 
This apparent practice of accommodation is however contradicted by police heavy 
handedness on illegal miners, as well as state pronouncements from the national to the 
local level (Midlands Observer, 14 May 2007). At a more formal level, the state has 
vacillated between banning the illicit minerals trade altogether and controlling and 
managing it. That in 2007 all small scale miners were ordered to stop mining until the 
Ministry of Mines sorted out issues of registration suggests a shift towards regulation and 
accommodation of those likely to be in the illegal mining trade. 
The city of Kwekwe Executive Mayor, while applauding small scale miners' 
contribution to the national economy also called upon buyers and miners to sell their gold 
in the formal channels through Fidelity Printers to avoid smuggling of gold. This will not 
succeed because of the wide disparities between parallel market price and official prices 
offered by RBZ. Miners and buyers argue that they can only sell to RBZ at a loss. In July 
2007 RBZ was buying at $1, 2 million per gram while the parallel market buyers were 
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paying $3 million per gram. The RBZ offer price was even lower than the local buyer's 
purchase price from illegal miners, yet RBZ expected the buyer to sell to it. 
Furthermore, when the buyers and miners sell to RBZ, unlike parallel market 
buyers it has not been swift in its payment. In August 2007, RBZ was struggling to pay 
US$17 million to miners because it lacked foreign currency. According to the Chamber 
of Mines by end of June 2007 gold producers had not been paid since May 2006, forcing 
them to operate below 20% capacity (The Standard, 1 July 2007, Bl). Moreover the 
support price quickly loses value due to inflation, with some commodities' prices 
increasing by 818% in less than two months (Bl). As a result even though the RBZ has 
been increasing the gold support price with every policy statement, this has not helped 
much. The July 2004 monetary policy increased support price from Z$71 000, to Z$85 
000, (21), which was further increased in July 2005 from Z$175,000/gram to 
Z$230,000/gram, but this has not helped in curbing the gold parallel market. As long as 
these disparities exist, coupled by policy contradictions illegal gold trafficking will 
persist. 
The RBZ position on gold panning activities, Chikorokoza (illegal gold miner), is 
less satisfactory for a bank known for its avowed hard line stance against illicit economic 
activities. The bank's practice of giving special licenses to designated agents to buy gold 
where the activities are concentrated in the name of 'decentralization of Gold buying' is 
self-contradictory and self defeating (Gono, 2004, 28). In his July 2004 statement Gono 
notes that "176 custom millers and 38 Agents are working together with Fidelity Printers 
and Refiners (the gold buying arm of RBZ)' (Gono, 2004, 20). The rationale was that this 
would 'reduce grey market activities' but by giving buyers - most of whom are 
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surrogates for senior ZANU-PF officials - licenses the bank is tolerating illegal miners 
and thus encouraging panning, effectively contradicting its clampdown on gold trading 
activities. Moreover, most of the buyers remain unregistered. According to one buyer 
based in Totororo (who works closely with a ZANU-PF councilor and deputy Mayor for 
Chegutu) there are very few if any registered buyers. Ironically, the RBZ has no problems 
accepting gold from these buyers during the rare times they sell to the bank. 
In sum, the case of informalisation of production in gold mining poses intriguing 
questions, some of which potentially create a dilemma for the state. These questions form 
part of the business of the next chapter. 
A lot of what is manifesting in the crisis is a result of political decisions. It is a 
result of a patronage based mode of appropriation which stems from problems of 
primitive accumulation. It is thus compelling to devote the coming final analysis to make 
an incisive assessment of the central premise of this work, that Zimbabwe's crisis has 
much to do with the uneasy road to market civilization as presided by a party state whose 
acquisitive instincts have further entrenched the resultant informalisation of production. It 
is hoped that in so doing, the paper will address the question of whether what is occurring 
is a case of disaccumulation rather than accumulation. To do more than is called for, in 
the interest of further research the same chapter will comment briefly on the socio-
environmental outcomes of the crisis and its concomitant forms of accumulation. 
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Chapter 5: 
Conclusion: 
Whither the Zimbabwean State? 
Progressing Towards Market Civilization 
or Regressing to Barbarism? 
The burden of this chapter is to juxtapose the empirical survey presented in the last three 
chapters with the theoretical postulations made in this study's formative chapters. This is 
by no means an easy task. As with any social science research, much of what has been 
presented herein will remain subject to manifold interpretations. However, this epilogue, 
in fact this whole study - owes answers to specific questions that have been raised at the 
outset. For that reason the prime focus will be to unpack those questions as reflected in 
the chapter title. 
The evidence presented hitherto makes the above question a vexatious one, more 
so given the limited time span for the study. Questions of whether the direction of present 
economic phenomena indicates progress towards or regress from 'market civilisation' 
requires more time than the present study can afford us. For that reason the contradictory 
motions evinced are to be expected, albeit making this assessment even more 
cumbersome. Nevertheless, this does not render futile this exercise. In fact, it aids in 
understanding how specific conjunctures like political and economic crisis combine with 
the nature of the state to shape dynamics of accumulation. It is the aggregate sum of such 
moments spread across the historical plane that define accumulation in the long run. The 
author recognizes some overlaps to the objects of this study. These are briefly highlighted 
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below. The aim is to shed light if not placate interest for further research on the social and 
environmental impacts of gold panning activities. 
The socio-environmental impacts of the unregulated mode of wealth 
accumulation can never be fully measured by a study such as this one. Yet, in the course 
of the study, albeit more concerned with dynamics of accumulation and how those 
connected to the state are benefiting, the visibility of the social and environmental 
impacts of the processes is too glaring for one to overlook. Both operational and disused 
mining pits are all over the land surface. These pits are merely abandoned after use and 
the likely erosion would create gullies but for the very low rainfall the area receives. 
More so the unclosed pits are a hazard to livestock normally left to graze in the open. The 
open cast mining of gold also comes with wanton destruction of vegetation in this 
predominantly semi arid area. As mentioned in chapter four efforts involving the 
Ministry of Mines, local government and panners to try and rehabilitate the environment 
have been restricted to in and around the city of Kwekwe. Yet even this limited effort has 
had minimal success. 
There are social vices that come with a high population concentration. Sexually 
transmitted diseases have been prevalent among panners. This is even more worrying 
among local female school children. Clinic data suggests that young school girls were 
having unprotected sex for money with illegal gold miners (Sidhakeni Clinic Log Chart, 
January 2004 - December 2006 and January-June 2007). At the height of gold panning in 
Totororo in 2005 prostitution became so rampant that a local businessman had to 
construct booking houses to accommodate prostitutes flocking to Totororo from other 
areas (Anonymous 4, Interview, 2007). Teachers complained of increased abstentions, 
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especially for boys who would go to mine for gold instead of attending school. According 
to the headmaster this was both good and bad: good in that the children would thus raise 
money to pay school fees; bad in that they would fail to attend school, with some 
completely ceasing to attend and get married at a young age. Parents and teachers 
complained about youth indiscipline. Teachers, expected to be an affluent middle class 
and traditionally commanding respect if not envy in Zimbabwe, especially in rural areas, 
lost the respect of their pupils who suddenly found themselves more economically 
empowered than their teachers. Incidents of theft within the community were also 
common. For these impacts the community associates panning with moral degeneracy. 
Party State and Economic Social Stratification 
The mode of appropriation that has dominated the current crisis period in Zimbabwe 
expresses itself more eloquently in the unfolding social configurations. These 
configurations have been contradictory in many ways. This reflects the chaotic manner in 
which accumulation has taken place over the past eight years. The first contradiction 
stems from the growing lack of distinction between party or political office and 
accumulation. Political office corresponds with accumulation more and more. The party 
state thus collapses into a localized capitalist oligarchy. When one can accumulate wealth 
overnight, one can pass from one class to another. Overnight one can wake up a land 
owner, though this can be an illusion as long as the property rights are not secured. 
As the economic situation has worsened the party-state patronage system has 
become more entrenched. The party and its beneficiaries are increasingly growing 
conscious of the utilitarian value of managing appropriation as a method of control and 
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buying the electorate. In this sense, and when restricted within the scope of the 
Zimbabwe party-state accumulation mode, a triple-layered socio-politico-economic 
stratification can be envisaged. One has on its apex a class, somewhat difficult to define 
but combining business, public, private and political office be it in party or government -
'comrades in business' (Capps, 2007, 30) - involved in both legal and illegal 
accumulation activities66. This class might also fit Miliband's definition of a 'power elite' 
(see Chapter 1 page 15). 
Below the 'power elite' is a stratum that could tentatively be lableled a 'middle 
class'. This group does not meet the conventional definition of middle class. One would 
think here of business managers and public servants, positions which come with the 
requisite learning this group lacks. That this groups lacks these attributes underlines the 
contradictory alignment of classes that has come with the Zimbabwe crisis. However this 
groups' function in Zimbabwe's political economy of crisis imitates that of a 'normal 
middle class' or the conventional 'new petty bourgeoisie' (Poulantzas, 1975, 209). In it 
one finds the linkman or front man, a conduit managing illegal deals for the elite. 
Sometimes this is a managing partner. Often this is the village based gold buyer, local 
Chief and Headman. This group is also identified by its location at the or close to the 
resource site where it represents the big chef who is either ashamed or too busy to be 
there. In a few cases members of this group have ended up being serious accumulators in 
their own right. The lower strata consist of gold panners and militia on one hand and 
subsistent farmers who double as infrequent panners on the other. 
66 Note that Gavin Capps uses the term 'comrades in business' in reference to ANC Struggle notables 
benefiting from Black Economic Empowerment specifically in Diamond Mining 
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A Crisis born class of accumulators 
The crisis born accumulating class or perhaps what the Zimbabwe Independent columnist 
Muckraker has termed a 'vulturine class' (July 13-19, 2007) no longer appears 
subliminally but out in the open. Since the genesis of the Zimbabwe crisis and its 
accompanying 'grab and take' economics this class has become self-reproducing and 
self-perpetuating and thus self-expanding. This expansion owes to the informalised and 
deregulated mode of production such as the chaotic land reform that saw a lot of ZANU-
PF members and war veterans getting farms. Added to this is the selective enforcement of 
laws on criminalized economic activities which has widened access to rents by those 
connected to ZANU-PF. The outcomes of the party's primary elections conducted to 
choose party candidates for the 29 March 2008 national elections suggest that this class 
now shapes politics in ZANU-PF (The Standard, 2008; NewZimbabwe, 2008). For the 
ruling elite and their network of beneficiaries the economic utility of political office has 
become starker than ever. In that regard, political contests have collapsed into a form of 
what Bayart has famously called la politique du ventre (the politics of the belly) (Bayart, 
1983;Bayartetal, 1999,8). 
The new/crisis-born class of accumulators suggested in chapter one of this work 
to be embryonic and perceivable 'in a mirror dimly' is thus no longer in the distance. In 
the case for this study one local gold buyer (an ex-mine worker at the former BHP 
Hartley Platinumn mine in Chegutu) has accumulated a considerable number of assets 
and opened grocery shops. In the initial stages of his business he had the support of 
Mariyapera, a prominent ZANU-PF member, businessman and councilor in Chegutu well 
known for terrorizing residents and opponents with his militia. There are many other 
-108-
cases of people who have broken new ground out of the Zimbabwean economic chaos. In 
Totororo alone, there are more than five buyers who have had similar success, all 
connected to party and big chefs in the government. The gold buyer referred to above, 
once a political novice, is now reportedly becoming more active within the party local 
structures. 
As noted in the third chapter, these majestic rags to riches stories go beyond 
illegal mining to all unregulated economic activities that have come out of the Zimbabwe 
crisis. In a case of agglomeration of economies other businesses have arisen and thrived 
with the blooming of illegal gold mining. In the peak of Totororo's 2005 illegal gold 
mining activities, the local shopping centre saw the construction of booking houses for 
accommodation as demand arose due to the influx of migratory panners and prostitutes 
targeting them. One local businessman, a headmaster, constructed two new grocery shops 
and a bottle store. However, with the passing of the gold boom these businesses are now 
on a decline. With panners having moved to other areas, the businesses lack a basis for 
continuity. The discontinued demand that had been generated by the gold rush has left 
ghost structures. 
It is safe thus to suggest that one challenge in these accumulation stories is their 
sustainability. At the lower levels of the party state evidence of both accumulation and 
disaccumulation run concurrently. These crisis connected accumulation opportunities 
seem to be incidental and transitory. The case of Totororo businesses dwindling after the 
gold rush is identical to case of the former Zimbabwe Dairy Board worker-come-
businessman, who after having been thriving for more than three years was forced to 
close some of his shops due to government price control blitzes. In the long run, the 
-109-
informalisation of productions which has conceived this new class of accumulators may 
be the very threat to its continued economic survival. No matter their reliance on the 
ruling party, the livelihoods of these entrepreneurs can never be certain and guaranteed 
unless laws are applied more consistently. It is no wonder the ruling party has virtually 
become a platform for accumulation contests. In this context the assumption of party 
and/or political office becomes a means to ensure economic certainty, as fragile as that is. 
That the ruling party has collapsed into an arena for accumulation battles 
manifests itself through court battles over the ownership of grabbed farms, politically 
motivated economic crime charges and counter charges involving party chefs, verbal and 
violent militia clashes at accumulation sites, and more recently, violent clashes during 
party primary elections. In a typical case of old elites hanging themselves with their own 
rope (Moore, 2004, 159) a number of senior ZANU-PF officials have lost the right to 
represent their party to some members of this new class they created. Increased economic 
and political contestation in an unregulated context has made recruitment and hiring of 
militias a necessity for senior party members. In the gold panning these militias have 
often double as partial employees and part chief militias. 
A Labour force of a new type? 
One may not finish discussing progress towards or regression from 'market civilization' 
without looking at the issues of the labour force. Historically one characteristic of the 
take off to capitalist development is the alienation of a majority of people from the means 
of production - land. This alienation creates surplus labour since the alienated are left 
with no resource to reproduce from but the sale of their labour. Is there such a process in 
Zimbabwe? The racialized land reform exercise which saw Mugabe grabbing farms from 
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minority whites and redistributing to 'landless blacks' would have us believe otherwise. 
If land was taken from a few white capitalists to a black majority, who hypothetically 
were formerly sellers of wage labour since they had been hitherto alienated from land, 
effectively a reverse of primitive accumulation or 'disaccumulation' occurred. On the 
other hand, some got land and thus started on the road to small commodity production -
in principle. 
However the redistributive extent of Zimbabwe's land reform exercise still 
remains debatable. In effect the process has been contradictory. Thousands of blacks 
were reportedly given land (Moyo, 2007) while at the same time thousands of farm 
workers were left jobless and excluded from land. From this study a considerable number 
of these have found solace in illegal gold mining. Moreover the government cronies and 
party heavy weights have been the main beneficiaries, some becoming multiple farm 
owners. Land grabs instigated by top members of government and military have not 
halted despite pronouncements at several times that the process has successfully ended. 
Characteristically these grabs have not targeted white owned farms only but even ones 
owned by blacks and ruling party supporters. 
It is possible to rethink the position of the illegal gold miner and the illegal gold 
buyer in the informalised and unregulated production cycle in the context of the question 
of surplus labour and the logic of access to and alienation from land resources. Indeed, 
one must spread the analysis to include not only the gold miner, but the also militiaman 
and even the parallel market forex dealer working for and enjoying the protection of the 
ruling elite. However, the gold miner serves better in this illustration because of his 
interaction with the land resource. An analysis of those involved in illegal gold mining 
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and the nature of their involvement persuades one to contemplate a labour force of a new 
type. It is mostly young people aged between 17 and 30 who form this group. Children as 
little as 14 years make isolated but extreme cases. Clearly the overwhelming involvement 
of the active age group which under normal circumstances should be employed elsewhere 
suggests that panning has become a long term vocation for those unemployed. The 
qualification of these as a labour force rests in that though they have access to, they do 
not own any means of production. 
The nomadic panner depends on access to a resource i.e. a panning site that is not 
his. Though communally accessible, this resource is not even communally owned as is 
often made to appear the case. On the part of the state it is in fact the unresolved and/or 
often conflicting postulations with regards to issues of such property rights that result in 
lack of clarity and often haphazard and half hearted enforcement of rights. The 
'communal' aspect to 'everyone's property' makes it possible for 'anyone' to access 
these sites. This lack of clarity stems from the conflict and ambiguity between traditional 
ownership structures and capitalist norms as a nation titters back and forth between 
retention of pre-capitalist modes or transforming into a fully fledged market (Rutherford, 
3, 2001, Cheater, 3-14, 1984). In our case study, at one point the local chief Samambwa 
found himself at odds with the police and mining ministry when he encouraged locals to 
access the mining tunnel in Totororo on the basis that it is 'their land' from the traditional 
norms stand point. In the untrue, rather hypocritical sense which conflates with ZANU-
PF populist rhetoric a mining site is portrayed as a people's resource. 
Whereas these sites are accessible to 'everyone' making them seem public 
goods, they are in fact not owned by anyone in the local community. Even though the 
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ZANU-PF populist rhetoric has often taken a form which implies everyone's property, 
practice shows it is the ZANU-PF ruling elite that really has assumed ownership of 
'everyone's' property. On the basis of its capacity to use coercion to regulate access to 
these sites as it will, the Zimbabwe party state becomes the de-facto owners. The panner 
is thus dispensable. Access to 'every one's' resource can be restricted or forfeited 
altogether whenever the party-state decides. 
By having this controlled access to the means of production (mining sites) at the 
grace of the party-state the miners do not own anything but their labour power. In selling 
the small grams of gold, what the panners are selling is in fact their labour. This makes 
more sense when one considers that quite a significant number of these miners are former 
mine and farm workers who, whether by choice or exclusion have not gained land from 
the fast track land reform. For that reason, the 'real' capitalists are the members of the 
ruling elite who have control of the means of production through the party-state. The elite 
can either choose to operate more directly at the mine through a syndicate or have bands 
of nomadic miners to mine for him and pay wages in the name of buying, without 
entering a formal work contract. The miners have little or no control over both the selling 
price and access to means of production. The 'real capitalist' permits the illegal miners to 
access 'his' resource without hindrance thus making them a labour force of a new type. 
To make this plain one may argue that if the panned gold was not reaching the employer 
(ruling elite or those connected to the part state) they would have been more purposeful 
in curbing these activities. This 'labour force of a new type' forms one of the several 
unique twists to the tail of primitive accumulation suggested earlier in the first chapter. 
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The 'Gold Bank' 
While there is no doubt that the disordered style of accumulation dominating the 
Zimbabwe crisis has been tapped into mainly by those connected to the party and state, 
one may argue that it has also provided survival nets for the general rural population. For 
instance, one may note a phenomenon that may be regarded as the 'gold bank'. Rural 
subsistence farmers have been able to tap into gold panning when ever they want cash in 
case of unforeseen financial requirements. For instance when a homestead receives a 
visitor, the host simply asks a young adult man, to go 'kumwena' (the hole/tunnel) or 
'kumari' (literally to money), meaning to go and pan and sell a few milligrams of gold to 
buyers at the local shops so that they can have cash to host a visitor. In this case, it may 
be suggested that they are literally cashing in on the tunnel, withdrawing from a gold 
bank. 
In this context one may need to locate the rural subsistence family within this 
unregulated production circle. In the area of study gold panning is not a new trend, but 
the years of economic crisis have further increased the activity. The increased illegal 
mining owes more to the migratory miners and involved members of the ruling elite than 
to the traditional rural subsistence farmers. There is no doubt that in drought years there 
has been a trend towards relying on illegal gold panning. However this has often been 
more restricted to alluvial river bank panning. It has already been noted that the groups 
mainly involved from the local village are the youths. 
In the case of the elderly - male and female - household and homestead headers, 
involvement in gold panning comes as a result of poor rainfall and shortage of farming 
inputs for which they have relied on the state. In recent years the ZANU-PF government 
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has rarely been able to provide these. Where it has, distribution has been based on party 
allegiance. The reduced crop production has meant increased reliance on donor hand 
outs, but these have not been enough. Moreover the present political environment has 
constrained donor activities, as noticeable in Totororo. The result has been to force 
villagers to rely more and more on the cash economy than before. This abets the 
emergence of what is suggested to be the 'gold bank phenomenon'. 
The presence of gold and mushrooming activities in the panning has not 
transformed the majority of villagers into wealth accumulators. They have remained 
essentially subsistence producers. When they go to extract gold this has been to meet a 
specific house-hold demand like school fees, to buy basic food necessities, or to prepare a 
'nice meal' for a visitor from town among other incidental needs. Most rural dwellers do 
not run any bank accounts (few Zimbabwean still do, due to hyper inflation). The way 
villagers relate to the gold resource amounts to making the local gold tunnel a bank from 
which to withdraw money when they need cash. 
Although stated above in a limited sense the gold bank phenomenon can be 
applied to Zimbabwe's general economy of crisis or what may be a 'survival economy' 7. 
The picture that unfolds is that the unregulated production has favored a hand to month 
mode of survival (Mawowa, 2006, 5). In as much as rural dwellers resort to kumwena for 
subsistence, subsistence 'business' economic activities have become common in urban 
areas especially through illegal marketing activities. These activities are not done 
consistently or to generate profit per se but to raise cash for a particular moment. The 
67 The term 'survival economy' was used Lubna Nadvi, a lecturer in UKZN's Political Science department, 
to describe the Zimbabwe case. She was commenting on the November 6, 2007 presentation I did on 
Zimbabwe's political economy of crisis. 
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only difference between the urban case and the rural case is that the urban dwellers rely 
more on cash than do rural dwellers. As a result subsistence urban marketers engage in 
their activities more frequently. In that sense, the unregulated mode of production that 
came with the crisis and the high levels of unemployment have provided for a gold bank 
mode of survival both in rural and urban areas. 
The gold bank phenomenon further adds to the ambiguous nature of the direction of 
accumulation trends emerging at the behest of the current Zimbabwe economic crisis. It 
portrays a growing class of accumulators alongside a concurrent increase in subsistence 
economic behaviour. The trend to increase subsistence economic activities signifies a 
domestication of production which is the opposite to the classical development of capital. 
In the build up to industrialization, domestic/cottage industry gave way to big industry. 
The opposite of this seems to be happening in Zimbabwe. Closure of industries is 
resulting in unemployment, which in turn, given Zimbabwe's open informal market, has 
seen most redundant workers and those never employed resorting to subsistence 
entrepreneur ship. This is appears to be a clear reversal of capitalist development, while at 
the same time the formation of an accumulating class indicates 'something' comparable 
to development of capital. Thus appear the contradictions. 
Last Word 
Zimbabwe appears locked in a winding process of primitive accumulation and state 
formation. The obtaining unregulated 'illegal' mode of accumulation and appropriation, 
initiated in the absence of vital political national consensus, as has been the case in the 
past phases of Zimbabwe's capitalist development is subject to reversal and reordering. 
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With questions of property rights still unresolved, gains of the current process are not 
beyond reversal. With the MDC repeatedly promising to reverse the order, bring to book 
and return business to normalcy a new political order may be set to banish the system 
(Tsvangirai, 2008). This partly explains the tendency by war veterans, pro-ZANU-PF 
business people and other beneficiaries to coalesce increasingly around the political 
establishment. 
Even with a new leadership in ZANU-PF, the possibility of reordering seems 
inevitable. Recent developments that saw former finance minister Simba Makoni 
challenging Mugabe for the 29 March 2008 election suggest a challenge to the disorder 
that has been allowed to dominate accumulation in the past eight years. There is therefore 
a growing consensus in respect to issues of protecting property rights both within and 
outside ZANU-PF. Any post-Mugabe leadership is thus likely to challenge the current 
system of patronage and Zimbabwe not long from now is likely to see a return of 
international capital. The return is slowly taking place behind the cries of the crisis as 
seen by recent activities by the 'oldest capitalist' Lonhro (Mberi, 2007; Kaseke, 2007). 
While the unregulated nature of accumulation has favoured the new party state 
club of accumulators it is not good for them in the long run. Historically 
primary/primitive accumulation has been characterised by hook, crook and violent 
dispossessions (Marx, 1972, 432). This is comparable to what is obtaining in Zimbabwe. 
The difference however is that in the former case the state has often moved in to provide 
institutions to support regulate and protect legally and coercively these gains (Perelman, 
2000; Anderson, 1947). Once taken off this class need protection institutionally and 
otherwise. This is lacking in Zimbabwe because the state is unstable. It is difficult at this 
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stage to legitimate whether politically or legally accumulation processes that have taken 
place thus far. That is the greatest handicap of the post colonial state. 
Questions of property ownership mean that there can be no full embrace of the 
logic of markets. The contradictions in government policy on empowerment and legal 
enforcement mean that question of property rights and capturing of the so called parallel 
economy into the formal economy will remain unresolved. The sustainability of the class 
and accumulation outcomes of the current crisis will thus rely more on the legal structure 
that will emerge in the next political dispensation. There are chances that not all will be 
reversed but there is also no doubt that the current situation will be subject to reordering. 
A radical shift towards established large (international) capital that may blend with the 
new class of accumulators is a possibility. Of course this new class of accumulators risks 
being swallowed or elbowed out by the more established capital - constituted by former 
white capitalists and international capital, depending on whether the state will protect it 
or not. 
It may be that as the problem of state formation rages on, Zimbabwe is in for an 
elongated process of primitive accumulation. For long blood will continue to drip. On the 
other hand the disillusionment with Mugabe's redistributionist rhetoric might lead to an 
extreme embrace of the market - as suggested by the open arms approach to dealing with 
international capital by Simba Makoni ZANU-PF group and MDC. In the end it may be 
that after all the dust settles the real winner will be the 'international capital' which will 
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